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LABOR, LUCK, AND LOVE: RECONSIDERING THE 
SANCTITY OF SEPARATE PROPERTY 
Shari Motro • 
"Marriage is a proclamation that one need not battle alone the vicissitudes 
that life can bring, but can rely on a partner to share the burdens of living 
in what sometimes seems a capricious and indifferent universe. ''"~ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most jurisdictions' current family law systems embody the principle 
that marriage turns separate individuals into economic partners. If marriage 
ends, the fruits ofboth spouses' labor-the earnings accumulated by either 
spouse during marriage-are classified as marital property subject to divi-
sion at divorce. Assets acquired before marriage and gifts or inheritances 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D., 
New York University School of Law. I am thankful to Christopher Cotropia, Hanoch Dagan, Ira Mark 
Ellman, Jessica Erickson, James Gibson, Corinna Lain, Kristen Osenga, Noah Sachs, Jana B. Singer, 
Benjamin Spencer, and Peter Swisher for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to 
the faculties at the University of Georgia School of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark, and Brooklyn 
Law School for their probing responses to talks I delivered there. I am also thankful to my research as-
sistants Lauren Dickey and Graham Magill. The graphic illustrations were designed by Ehud 
Tal/Empax in consultation with Matthew Woolman. A research grant from the University of Richmond 
School of Law helped fund this work. 
t MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 147 (1993). 
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received during marriage, on the other hand, generally belong to each 
spouse separately. The classification of these assets as sacrosanct separate 
property means that they are sheltered from division at divorce. Thus, la-
bor-generated property presumptively belongs to spouses as a unit, while 
premarital and luck-generated (gifted or inherited) property belongs to 
spouses as separate individuals. Why the difference? 
Earnings from labor are marital property because marriage is consid-
ered a joint venture to which each spouse contributes a combination of ef-
fort, sacrifice, and mutual support. Regardless of the relative market value 
of spouses' contributions, the law grants each spouse a right to the eco-
nomic fruits of the marriage under the theory that spouses' monetary and 
nonmonetary contributions are of equal importance to the marriage. This 
arrangement also guarantees that homemakers are indirectly compensated 
for their nonwage labor without subjecting them to uncomfortable investi-
gations into the market value of their contributions. 
Unlike spouses' marital earnings, property acquired before marriage 
and gifts and inheritances received during marriage are regarded as external 
to the marital economic partnership. Property acquired before marriage 
cannot be said to be a product of spouses' joint venture because the labor 
expended to produce it preceded their union. Gifts and inheritances re-
ceived during marriage, the theory goes, likewise cannot be said to be a 
product of the spouses' collective efforts. By definition, gifts and inheri-
tances are not compensation for labor; they result from donors' altruistic 
impulses to give without expecting anything in return. Gifts and inheri-
tances in particular are also kept separate from the joint marital pot out of 
respect for donors' intentions. · 
The notion that assets should be treated differently based on whether 
they came into the marriage through spouses' labor permeates most schol-
arly, statutory, and judicial discussions of marital property law. But with 
the exception of recent proposals by the American Law Institute (ALI) and 
by Carolyn Frantz and Hanoch Dagan, this labor-centered marital property 
rule has gone largely unquestioned. Indeed, some commentators take the 
labor-based classification paradigm as too self-evident to justify.' In reality, 
the theory and its application are riddled with inconsistencies. 
1 See 1. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 250 (1989) 
("[T]he distinction between separate property and marital property ... is perceived by most people as 
fair. There seems to be general acceptance today that spouses should share the fruits of the marital part-
nership, but not other property."); Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or 
Death, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 1227, 1237-38 ("All fifty states are ... guided, at least to some degree, by a 
partnership theory of marriage when considering how to distribute property in the context of divorce, 
and most scholars and advocates have come to take the theory for granted. Indeed, most recent scholar-
ship and policy proposals do not question the partnership theory, but instead focus on how both separate 
property and community property states can more faithfully implement the theory at divorce."); see also 
Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a 
Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567 (1995); Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of 
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First, the labor-centered rule naively assumes that spouses with uti-
equal separate holdings will be equally invested in the marriage as a joint 
venture. In many cases, spouses with widely divergent wealth have a dis-
proportionate exposure to risk. As a result, they may not expend the same 
efforts toward income production-both before and during marriage. A law 
school graduate with a $10 million safety net is less likely to prioritize eco-
nomic considerations in her choice of career path than one who enters the 
profession empty-handed or in debt. Where a born-rich dilettante marries a 
self-made professional, the labor-centered rule strictly applied produces 
perverse results-only the worker is forced to share. 
Also, the line between acquisitions attributable to marital labor and 
those attributable to other factors-like premarital labor and sheer luck-is 
impossible to draw accurately. Many gifts and inheritances are not the re-
sult of pure altruism, but rather reflect, at least in part, a quid pro quo, an 
unarticulated exchange. On the flip side, earnings are rarely attributable 
solely to contemporaneous effort. Most often, earnings reflect a combina-
tion of past and current labor, as well as circumstances over which the indi-
vidual worker has little control--circumstances that can often be traced to 
gifts, favors, or inherited privilege. An individual's education, cultural flu-
ency, and professional contacts accessed through social and familial net-
works are just some of the lucky breaks that impact financial success. 
Finally, the labor-centered partnership theory conflicts with widely 
held intuitions and typical practices in ongoing marriages. Property that 
would be considered separate as a legal matter is hardly ever kept wholly 
separate from the marriage. Rather, propertied spouses tend to share more 
and more of their individual assets as marriage progresses, mixing labor-
and luck-generated property as their relationship grows and deepens.2 
These problems may explain why in practice, deviations from the la-
bor-centered rule abound. Various judicial trends and divorce doctrines-
including transmutation by use,3 commingling of separate and marital prop-
erty,4 and the treatment of income from and appreciation of separate prop-
Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the 
Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487 (2000). 
2 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.12 cmt. a (2000) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES) ("After many years of marriage, 
spouses typically do not think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they would be so 
classified under the technical rules. Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such assets will 
be available to provide for their joint retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse, or for the other 
personal emergencies. The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the spouses will have made de-
cisions about their employment or the use of their marital assets that are premised in part on such expec-
tations about the separate property of both spouses."). 
3 This doctrine recharacterizes separate property that has been used by both spouses-e.g., a family 
home-as marital property. See infra Part III.B. 
4 This doctrine treats accounts and property traceable to a combination of separate and marital funds 
as entirely marital property. See infra Part III.B. 
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ertyS-effectively erode the labor-centered rule by assigning to the marriage 
property that, according to partnership theory, should belong to spouses 
separately. 
Though these backdoor solutions address some inconsistencies in the 
current rule, they create other problems. For one, they are largely depend-
ent on judicial discretion. As such they are unpredictable, they prolong and 
complicate settlement negotiations, and they raise the economic and emo-
tional costs of divorce. Separate property is sacrosanct in theory, but in re-
ality a given divorce could result in the division of marital earnings and 
other property to an alarmingly unpredictable extent. 
Additionally, some of the doctrines overreach. For example, the 
transmutation of separate property that is shared during marriage penalizes 
propertied spouses for their generosity and produces a windfall for their 
mates. The rule thus puts propertied spouses in a bind. On the one hand, 
sharing their wealth exposes them to the risk that everything they own will 
be subject to division at divorce. On the other hand, keeping property sepa-
rate when their hearts are ready to share may poison their chance at building 
a flourishing marriage based on love and trust: 
Even before marriage, the current paradigm may damage relations. 
Because the economic implications of marriage are so uncertain, courting 
couples are left to their own devices in imagining a conceptual framework 
for dealing with unequal resources. Those who choose to write their own 
private marriage contracts swim in treacherous waters, as the process of 
reaching this agreement can become adversarial, with each party advised by 
lawyers dedicated to maximizing their individual clients' advantages. 
The lack of clear legal and societal guidance on how much, if any, un-
earned and premarital wealth should be shared in marriage means that cou-
ples who cannot invent a sharing philosophy that strikes both parties as fair 
and safe have two options: live in conflict or split up. Those who do strike 
a balance must constantly renegotiate their sharing arrangement as circum-
stances change. This process forces them to repeatedly confront their 
power imbalance. "In cross-class marriages, one partner will usually have 
more money, more options, and, almost inevitably, more power in the rela-
tionship," explains one reporter of "marriages of unequals."6 The law's si-
lence on how much sharing is fair leaves laypeople to grapple on their own 
with a moral and philosophical challenge that often eludes judges and fam-
ily law experts alike. 7 
5 See infra Part 111.8 for a discussion concerning the varied treatments of appreciation of and in-
come from separate property. 
6 Tamar Lewin, A Marriage ofUnequals, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,2005, at AI. 
7 As one affluent wife put it, "I ... feel the awkwardness of helping [my son] buy a car, when I'm 
not helping [my husband's daughters] .... But I also have to be aware of overstepping." /d. The 
woman recalls wanting to help when these daughters' mother's house burned down. "I took out my 
checkbook," she said, "and I didn't know what was appropriate .... Emily Post doesn't deal with these 
situations." /d. 
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A different paradigm is clearly needed. The partnership theory's ex-
clusive focus on labor is inconsistent with what most Americans presume 
marriage means8 and with what civil marriage should mean in a society that 
values fairness and strives to create the best conditions for flourishing, lov-
ing relationships. Marriage is not fundamentally about equal contribution 
of labor. It is about two people joining the risks and rewards of their lives: 
merging their fates, committing to be "in the same boat," to sink or swim 
together, to contribute unequally at times if that's what it takes to keep the 
union afloat. 
When a sick husband checks into the hospital and becomes fully sup-
ported by his wife or when a wife leaves her job to care for her ailing parent 
knowing she can rely on her husband's income, labor contributions to the 
"joint venture" are clearly unequal. If the hospitalized husband or the wife 
caring for her parent subsequently inherits a small fortune, they are likely to 
share it with their wage-earning spouse. Marriage fuses separate individu-
als into one unit in which efforts, consumption, goals, and decisionmaking 
are intertwined. The law should treat it accordingly. 
This Article proposes a new alternative to the labor-centered marital 
property rule. Instead of focusing on how property was acquired, marital 
property law should look to spouses' overall financial resources and require 
them to share these resources to the extent they shape their identities during 
the marriage. Financial capability affects some of the most fundamental 
aspects of our lives-our health, our education, our work, the neighborhood 
in which we live. Marriages in which these aspects of spouses' identities 
are kept separate strike us as jarring. Imagine a husband and wife who 
sleep in the same bed, under the same roof, but who receive dramatically 
different levels of medical care. 
I do not propose that all preexisting, gifted, and inherited property be-
long to the marriage. Rather, the approach introduced in this Article attrib-
utes a percentage of separate property to the marriage based on the length of 
the marriage and on the property owner's life expectancy. The core concept 
is to spread separate property over the life of the owner spouse and to allo-
cate to the marriage a pro rata portion of this property.9 
8 Lisa Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, !6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
45, 4 7--48 (2007) ("One of the most comprehensive studies of American couples found that a large ma-
jority of married Americans believe that married couples 'should pool all their property and financial 
assets.' The ideal of sharing is so strong that courts and academic commentators often simply assume 
that happy couples pool their resources." (citing PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN 
COUPLES 101 (1983))); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence 
in Spousal Economic Relations 3 (May 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
("[B]roadly sharing resources is an entrenched social norm and is also overwhelmingly what spouses 
actually do."). Note, however, that the extent to which this sharing ideal is followed in practice is debat-
able. See Shari Motro, A New "!Do": Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REv. 
1509, 1523-24 nn.47-51 (2006). 
9 A graphic illustration of the concept appears in Part IV.A. 
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For example, suppose a person marries at age thirty with $1 million in 
premarital property. Suppose also that actuarial tables project that this 
spouse will live to age eighty. The couple then gets divorced ten years into 
the marriage (one-fifth of the way through the owning spouse's fifty-year 
life expectancy). In that case $200,000 (one-fifth of $1 million) would be 
classified as marital property subject to division. This $200,000 represents 
a rough measure of what the $1 million means to the owner spouse for the 
duration of the marriage-a rough translation of the psychological cushion 
the property provides. Attributing this amount as well as all spousal earn-
ings to the marriage means that for its duration, husband and wife experi-
ence the economic risks and dangers of life together. This approach ensures 
that workers and owners invest more comparably in the marriage than under 
the current rule, regardless of their inclinations, abilities, or motivations to 
generate income. At the same time, propertied spouses would be free to 
share their wealth without the fear that doing so would automatically con-
vert it to marital property. Finally, spouses with disproportionate resources 
would be given an objective, rational, and fair conceptual foundation for 
charting a joint life plan, a foundation designed to ease the anxiety that fi-
nancial imbalances can produce when a couple builds a home, plans for re-
tirement, or contemplates raising children. 
Part I introduces the labor-centered rule and explains its theoretical un-
derpinning-the partnership theory of marriage. Part II critiques the pre-
vailing paradigm. First, it argues that the current rule is theoretically 
inconsistent. Second, it shows that a wide range of caselaw and statutory 
provisions deviate from the principle. Finally, it reviews two recent pro-
posals that challenge the labor-centered rule. Both proposals are promising 
but incomplete. Part III builds upon these proposals and offers an alterna-
tive to the current treatment of premarital and unearned property: A classi-
fication paradigm that ensures that spouses join risks and rewards by 
contributing comparably out of their overall financial capability, regardless 
of the property's source. 
Before proceeding, a few provisos are warranted. First, this Article fo-
cuses exclusively on the classification of property at divorce because the le-
gal manifestations of the labor-centered paradigm are most explicit in 
decisions regarding divorce property settlements. That said, the proposal's 
ramifications are important in shaping ongoing marriages. As Frantz and 
Dagan put it: 
[Because] the legal rules surrounding marital property ... apply most often at 
the moment of divorce, commentators tend to focus more on their impact on 
divorced and divorcing couples than on ongoing marital relationships. But 
these rules are centrally about marriage, even marriages so successful they ul-
timately do not have to use them. Through marital property law, the state has 
the opportunity to help shape the social understanding of marriage, and thus 
the actions of those who partake in it. . . . [G]ovemance rules operate during 
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marriage ... to shape spouses' expectations and behavior with respect to mari-
tal property. 10 
Second, this Article is concerned with a backward-looking assessment 
of how much, if any, of what is traditionally defined as separate property 
should be subject to division as part of the property settlement at divorce. It 
is not concerned with postmarital earnings or with the needs of the spouses 
going forward. These issues are generally addressed through alimony or 
spousal support. 11 Although in many cases neither spouse owns any sepa-
rate property and the earnings accumulated in the course of marriage are in-
sufficient to provide for the nonearner or secondary earner going forward, 
much scholarship has already been devoted to the postdivorce needs of de-
pendent spouses. 12 Almost none has challenged the separate property prin-
ciple. This Article begins to fill in that gap. 13 
Third, this Article is not concerned with the question of whether fault 
should be a relevant factor in the division of marital property. For one, the 
issue has already received extensive scholarly attention. 14 More impor-
tantly, the marital property concept introduced below is equally relevant to 
10 Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 76 (2004) 
(footnote omitted). 
11 On the distinction between property division and alimony as conceptual frameworks, see id. at 
99-100 ("We use property division and alimony to signify different substantive considerations: Property 
division is backward-looking (looking at the marital relationship while it existed), while alimony reflects 
the law's concern with the postdivorce financial situation of the parties, their future needs, and their pro-
spective abilities."). 
12 See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15-51 (1985); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory 
of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. I (1989); Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: 
Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 
(2001); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution 
at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141 (2004); Jana B. Singer, Divorce 
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: 
Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1513 (2005); Joan Williams, Do Wives Own 
Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REv. 249 (1999) [hereinafter Williams, Do Wives 
Own Half?]; Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 
(I 994). 
13 It should be noted however, that while this work does not address postdivorce earnings, the pro-
posal advanced is not inconsistent with a more robust system of alimony. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, 
Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351 (1989); Singer, supra note 
12. Nor is it inconsistent with a property division model that includes increases in earning capacity in 
marital property. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at I 07-12. 
14 See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion on Property Division, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 891; Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern 
Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on 
No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. I (1987); Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Princi-
ples: A Farewell to Fault-But What Remedy for the Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive 
Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 213 (2001); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Katharine T. Bart-
lett, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1994). 
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fault-based and no-fault regimes. The choice between the two is therefore 
extraneous to this investigation. 
Fourth, at first glance, this Article may appear inapplicable to the mi-
nority of states that subject all property to division at divorce-so-called 
"hotchpot," "kitchen sink," or "all property" states. 15 But while these states 
do not distinguish between marital and separate property at the outset of di-
vorce proceedings, at the distribution stage they too tend toward the same 
labor-centered paradigm, usually awarding most or all preexisting, gifted, 
and inherited property to the owner spouse. 16 
A similar analysis explains the relevance of this discussion to non-
community property states. For much of this country's history, only com-
munity property states classified the fruits of spouses' labor as marital and 
preserved other property as separate. 17 But non-community property juris-
dictions have now adopted an essentially identical paradigm through equi-
table distribution regimes18 that come into play at divorce. 19 The proposal is 
thus applicable nationwide. 
Finally, this Article does not aim to dismiss reforms that have made di-
vorce more equitable over the last three decades. On the contrary, the part-
nership model and the equitable distribution revolution it inspired laid the 
groundwork for this project. Equitable distribution represents a marked im-
provement compared to the dominant title theory of marriage that preceded 
15 See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY§ 3.03(2) 
(2007). 
16 See FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 37.06 {Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2006) {"In some states, property 
acquired by gift or inheritance is subject to equitable distribution. In such states, statutes may permit a 
court to consider the source of such property as a factor in making an equitable distribution. Moreover, 
judicial decisions in these states may afford a degree of protection for property acquired by gift or in-
heritance, even if the statute provides that such property is subject to equitable distribution."); Gary, su-
pra note I, at 574 {"In seventeen states, all property owned by either spouse is subject to division. 
Courts in these states can still consider the origin of the property in order to determine distribution."); 
Oldham, supra note I, at 220 ("[E]ven kitchen sink states seem increasingly inclined to award 'separate' 
property to the owning spouse."). For a historical note on the increasing trend toward a dual- rather than 
all-property regime, see Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present 
and Future, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 807, 827-28. 
17 This "community system ofacquests" originated in the seventh century in Visigothic Spain. See 
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGI-IN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 3 (2d ed. 
1971). 
18 For this reason, this Article will refer to "marital property" as synonymous with "community 
property." See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 354 ("All common law states now permit equitable distribu-
tion of property at divorce, thereby recognizing that both spouses have been partners in acquiring prop-
erty during the marriage regardless of which spouse holds title."); see also OLDHAM, supra note 15, 
§ 5.03[1); John DeWitt Gregory, The ALI Property Division Principles: A Model of Radical Paternal-
ism, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 163, 166 n.21 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
19 During marriage, community and non-community property states remain distinct. In community 
property states, each spouse has a one-half interest in earnings upon their receipt. See DE FUNIAK & 
VAUGHN, supra note 17, § 66. In the other states, spouses hold individual title to their earnings unless 
and until divorce proceedings commence, at which point the earnings are classified as marital. !d. 
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it.20 The shift from title theory to equitable distribution turned many non-
and low-earning spouses from dependents with almost no property rights at 
divorce into full-fledged partners in a joint enterprise-if not in practice, 
then at least in theory. This Article contends that the revolution was in-
complete: marital property should include labor-generated property as well 
as the portion of luck-generated and premarital property allocable to the 
marriage. Partnership-based equitable distribution may be preferable to title 
theory, but it did not go far enough. This Article takes the next step. 
II. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT SYSTEM: THE 
PARTNERSHIP THEORY OF MARRIAGE 
A. The Marital Property Rule 
The most prevalent justification for the rule classifying spouses' earn-
ings as marital is known variously as the partnership theory of marriage,21 
the contribution theory/2 the joint property theory,Z3 or the marital-sharing 
theory.24 Partnership theory, as it is most widely used, refers to the princi-
ple that both spouses should be entitled to earnings acquired by either 
spouse because both spouses' direct and indirect contributions generated 
this income. It should be noted that although the "partnership theory of 
marriage" frequently refers to the marital property regime centered on con-
tribution of labor that is the focus of this Article, this is not always the 
20 Under the title theory of marriage, which guided divorce proceedings in non-community property 
states until the 1970s, earnings remained titled in the name of their nominal earner-usually the hus-
band. If the wife had not caused the divorce, she was generally granted relief in the form of alimony-a 
support award designed to enable her to maintain the lifestyle to which she was accustomed. Alimony 
was based on projected needs rather than retroactive entitlement; it was not tied to the amount of prop-
erty acquired during the marriage, and it was not conceived as compensation for the wife's efforts to as-
sist in the husband's income production. See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 3.02[1). But contrary to 
popular perceptions, alimony was often quite limited. See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 366-67. 
21 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 ("[U)se of the term ['partnership') is metaphorical and 
the analogy imperfect. It has become a common way, however, by which to describe the central princi-
ple that marriage involves the commitment of both spouses' labors, during their marriage, to the fam-
ily."). On the partnership theory of marriage generally, see Helene S. Shape, "A Tale of Two Systems": 
Anglo-American Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. L. REv. 707, 722 
(1993); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21,44 (1994). 
22 See, e.g., Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 89 ("Some scholars have argued that a liberal mar-
riage must ... include a commitment to giving each spouse what are singularly the fruits of his or her 
contribution."). 
23 See, e.g., Joan Williams, Do Wives Own Half?, supra note 12, at 265 ("If an asset is produced by 
two family members, it makes no sense to award ownership to only one of them."). 
24 See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Under [the marital-sharing theory], the economic 
rights of each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed marital bargain under which the 
partners agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage .... "). 
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case. 25 Still, because partnership has come to be used as shorthand for this 
contribution-of-labor idea, this Article will follow this convention. The 
theory comes in two forms: a descriptive, contract-based form and a restitu-
tionary, normative form. 26 
The contract-based version of the partnership theory applies a retroac-
tive assumption that if the parties had explicitly delineated the terms of their 
union at the outset, they would have agreed that the fruits of both spouses' 
labor would accrue to the marriage as a unit. According to this "hypotheti-
cal bargain" notion,27 marriage implies an agreement to pool earnings.28 
Property earned in the course of marriage should thus be classified as mari-
tal to match the parties' expectations and reliance interests.29 
The normative version of the partnership theory imposes a shared-
earnings rule on the parties regardless of whether they would have agreed to 
it based on a moral, restitutionary "return-of-contribution" notion.30 This 
approach recognizes that spouses who earn less generally have less bargain-
ing power, but insists that they be treated as equally deserving members of 
25 See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 21, at 722 ("[T]he partnership relationship of an ongoing marriage is 
more accurately described as 'a sharing of goods from each according to ability, to each according to 
need."'). 
26 See Shahar Lifshitz, On Past Assets and Future Assets, and on the Philosophy of Mutual Spousal 
Assets in Israeli Law, 34 MISHPATIM 627, 647-57 (2004) (Isr.). 
27 Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 687, 
723. 
28 See id. at 725 ("It is plausible to posit that modern married couples typically understand owner-
ship of assets during marriage to be shared property."); see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Marriage as Relation Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1308 (1998) (predicting that most couples would 
choose common ownership ex ante); Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Sometimes [the partnership the-
ory] is portrayed 'as an expression of the presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes 
on an equal basis, share and share alike.' Under this approach, the economic rights of each spouse are 
seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed marital bargain under which the partners agree that each 
is to enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage, that is, in the property nominally 
acquired by and titled in the sole name of either partner during the marriage (other than in property ac-
quired by gift or inheritance)." (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION Of fAMILY 
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND fAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 131 (!989))). But see 
Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 727 (suggesting that the attempt to devise "neutral" rules mirroring society's 
attitudes is futile because spouses' expectations are influenced by the existing legal system and that re-
formers should thus draft laws that both reflect existing mores and take_ responsibility for shaping new 
ones). 
29 See Scott, supra note 27, at 723-25 ("It seems improbable that most couples engaged in premar-
riage bargaining would agree to a quick and easy exit from marriage and minimal postdivorce familial 
obligation."); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1308 (asserting that equal distribution of property ac-
quired during the marriage follows the approach that most couples would choose ex ante); Waggoner, 
supra note 2 I, at 43 (noting that the partnership theory of marriage follows the assumption that spouses 
intend to pool their resources equally). 
30 See Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 650--657; Waggoner, supra note 21, at 43 ("Sometimes the theory 
is visualized in restitutionary terms, a return-of-contribution notion."). Elizabeth Scott has argued in 
particular that marriage most resembles a "relational contract." "In the commercial setting," she ex-
plains, "a relational contract is one that extends indefinitely over time, and that may serve multiple var-
ied purposes, creating a complex interdependent relationship." Scott, supra note 27, at 723. 
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the marital partnership based on fairness. 31 Non- or low-wage-earning 
spouses often contribute substantially to their partners' earnings-both di-
rectly, by serving as informal consultants and advisors, and indirectly, by 
managing the household and raising children. A rule designating earnings 
as marital ensures that this labor is compensated.32 
Once divorcing spouses' marital earnings are determined, two ap-
proaches generally govern the eventual distribution of this marital property. 
One divides the property based on a case-by-case calculus of the parties' 
relative contributions and needs; the other requires an equal division of all 
marital property without further inquiry.33 
Dividing marital property based on a case-by-case determination of 
relative contribution is the most theoretically consistent practical manifesta-
tion of the partnership principle, and some equitable distribution schemes 
require judges dividing marital property between the spouses to take both 
monetary and nonmonetary contributions into account.34 But many equita-
ble distribution schemes take spouses' postdivorce needs into account as 
well, a factor that frequently conflicts with the contribution factor. 35 In any 
31 In most cases this more economically vulnerable spouse is the wife; thus, the normative form of 
the insistence that all earnings be classified as marital was initially endorsed by many feminists. This 
same approach, however, has also been criticized as detrimental to women. See Rosenbury, supra note 
I, at 1233 ("[T]he partnership theory of marriage, while seemingly more egalitarian, may also reinforce 
wifely sacrifice by rewarding women for caring for their husbands and children at the possible expense 
of their own tangible property acquisition or other forms of individual fulfillment. The partnership the-
ory thereby reinforces traditional gender role expectations allocating wage work to men and care work 
to women . . . . [T]he partnership theory contributes to the perception that the allocation of wage work 
to men and care work to women is a natural division oflabor as opposed to a societal construct."). 
32 See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. 
33 Scholars disagree over whether and to what extent the equal division model prevails in practice. 
Compare ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a, reporter's notes cmt. b, Frantz & Dagan, supra 
note I 0, at I 00-02 ("[Equal division is t]he cornerstone of contemporary law of marital property .... "), 
Garrison, supra note 12, at 124 ("[O]nly a handful of states have equal statutory provisions establishing 
equal division as a presumptive outcome[, but] a larger number have judicial precedents that establish 
such a presumption or posit equal division as an analytical starting point."), and Williams, Do Wives 
Own Half?, supra note 12, at 266-67 ("We should ... give the wife half the accumulated family wealth 
based on her family work, without which that wealth could not have been created." (emphasis omit-
ted)), with Papuchis v. Papuchis, 341 S.E.2d 829, 830 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to adopt a rebut-
table presumption favoring equal division), and Rosenbury, supra note I, at 1237 ("[B]ecause the 
standards guiding the distribution [of marital property] can often be vague, courts have much room to 
determine that an unequal division is nonetheless equitable."). 
34 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 reporter's notes cmt. c; Gary, supra note I. For scholarly 
arguments in favor of including relative contribution as a factor in equitable distribution decisions, see 
Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1272 (1998). 
35 See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a ("[S]tatutes typically provide the judge no guid-
ance in weighing the relative importance of the various factors. Although these lists often include eight 
or 10 factors, most of the factors are specific examples of two basic but conflicting principles: property 
should be allocated in proportion to the spousal contributions to its acquisition, and property should be 
allocated according to relative spousal need. These principles conflict because the relative contribution 
of the spouses to the acquisition of marital property is usually inversely related to their relative financial 
need at divorce."). 
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case, ad hoc valuations of spouses' relative contributions and needs are bur-
densome and intrusive, and often mirror society's tendency to undervalue 
nonmarket labor.36 They also leave too much uncertainty as to the likely 
outcome of any given divorce.37 Finally, the case-by case approach requires 
assigning an objective value to the nonmarket contributions of the non- or 
low-earning spouse, something that many believe is undesirable and per-
haps impossible.38 
Rather than leaving the division of marital property entirely in the 
hands of judicial discretion, many jurisdictions and commentators support 
an equal division rule or presumption. 39 One version of this model assumes 
that a non-wage-earning spouse has indirectly earned half of the wage 
earner's accumulated income. Thus, for example, because married men 
earn more than unmarried men, wives-the argument goes-are responsible 
for the additional income earned by virtue of their husbands' marital 
status.40 Adding this excess to the imputed income from wives' household 
36 See Singer, supra note 12, at 1119 ("[D]ivorce doctrines that allow for substantial judicial discre-
tion generally operate to women's disadvantage .... The absence of clear-cut legal standards also af-
fects the negotiation process in ways that disadvantage the economically weaker party, generally the 
woman, in divorce. Finally, the lack of precise standards ... may drive up the costs associated with di-
vorce, particularly attorneys' fees, which again penalizes the economically weaker spouse."). 
37 For a discussion on the drawbacks of broad judicial discretion over divorce, see ALI PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. a ("[T]he decisional variability often found today in equitable-distribution sys-
tems arises at least in part because trial courts apply different principles as often as they face different 
facts. Yet the resulting variability in the principles by which cases are decided is of course unjust."); 
Oldham, supra note I, at 249-50 ("What is wrong with total judicial discretion in divorce decisions? 
Indeed, this might permit a court to make additional provisions for a dependent spouse. Still, when no 
limits are placed upon the divorce court's discretion, results in each state have been arbitrary."). 
38 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c. For arguments against commodification of 
household labor, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 81, 84-85, 116-17 (1997); cf Barbara Freedman Wand & Ilana Hurwitz, The "Genius 
Factor" and Equitable Distribution of Property at Divorce, BOSTON B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 10, 26-27 
(commenting on deCastro v. deCastro, 616 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Mass. 1993), in which the husband essen-
tially argued that courts should consider a new factor, the "genius factor," when fashioning an equitable 
distribution of property, and noting that "[i]f courts recognize a 'genius' factor and a 'super-
contribution' theory as appropriate considerations in equitable distribution of property, one must also 
consider the possibility of the recognition of a 'dunce' factor or 'inferior-contribution' theory, where one 
spouse could claim that an employed spouse performed less proficiently than the ordinary spouse in his 
profession, thus justifying a lesser portion of the marital assets to that spousf!'). 
39 Though early forms of the community property model-the progenitor of the labor-luck princi-
ple-employed a contribution-based division of community property, the dominant form of the model 
contemplated equal division at divorce. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 142-43 ("In many 
early forms of[ community property], the acquisitions, earnings and gains during the marriage were not 
shared equally between the spouses but rather in proportion to the amount of property each had brought 
or contributed to the marriage . . . . But by the time of the thirteenth century we find the Spanish law 
providing that the spouses should share in these things equally, that is by the halves, irrespective of 
whether one spouse was richer than the other, and this continued thereafter unchanged."); see also id. at 
2-3; Gary, supra note I, at 572. 
40 Note, however, that debate persists over whether the correlation between marital status and earn-
ings results from a causal relationship between the two. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 re-
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and childrearing labor-the money saved by not contracting out for these 
services41-might well entitle women to fifty percent of earnings. Wage-
earning women generally earn less than their husbands, but they make up 
the difference (some more than make up the difference) by shouldering 
most of the couple's domestic duties.42 But most commentators view such 
attempts at valuation as spurious. The more common justification for equal 
division focuses "on spouses' contribution to the entire marital relationship, 
not just to the accumulation of financial assets."43 Alternatively, rather than 
presuming to reflect an accurate gauge of relative contribution, equal divi-
sion embodies a general ideological and aspirational commitment to equal-
porter's notes cmt. c ("Married men ... earn more than unmarried men, which some observers take as 
evidence of [the premise that one spouse's homemaker services add to the other spouse's earning capac-
ity]."); Hal R. Varian, Analyzing the Marriage Gap, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at C2 (pegging the 
"marriage wage premium" at between ten and fifty percent and reporting on a study by economists Kate 
Antonovics and Robert Town, which concluded that marriage has a causal impact on wages). Other ob-
servers suggest instead the converse explanation for married men's greater earnings: men with financial 
promise are more likely to marry because they are more successful as suitors. One analysis of the data 
concludes, however, that neither explanation for married men's earning advantage is correct but that in-
stead, some third variable affects both male earnings and male marital prospects. Yinon Cohen & Yit-
chak Haberfeld, Why Do Married Men Earn More than Unmarried Men?, 20 Soc. SCI. RES. 29 (1991); 
see also Christopher Cornwell & Peter Rupert, Unobservable Individual Effects, Marriage and the 
Earnings of Young Men, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 285,285 (1997) (supporting Cohen and Haberfield in find-
ing that most of the male earnings premium attributed to marriage "is associated with unobservable in-
dividual effects that are correlated with marital status and wages"). But see Sanders Korenman & David 
Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282 (1991) 
(finding that the effect of marriage on earnings takes place over time, and suggesting that it results from 
marriage itself). There are a host of possible factors that could affect both marriageability and earning 
potential, thus confounding the analysis-for example, social skills, intelligence, and attractive personal 
appearance could all have a positive effect on both male earnings and male marriageability. 
41 For an estimate of the market value of nonearner married mothers, see Stay-at-Home Mother's 
Work Worth $138,095 a Year, REUTERS, May 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/ 
idUSN0236053520070502?src=050207 _I 719 _ARTICLE_PROMO _also_ on_reuters [hereinafter Stay-
at-Home Mother's Work] ("If the typical stay-at-home mother in the United States were paid for her 
work ... she would earn $138,095 a year .... The 10 jobs listed as comprising a mother's work were 
housekeeper, cook, day care center teacher, laundry machine operator, van driver, facilities manager, 
janitor, computer operator, chief executive officer and psychologist."). 
42 See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian 
Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 520 n.l8 (1998) (describing studies showing that women in dual-earner 
couples do more domestic work); Stay-at-Home Mother's Work, supra note 41 ("A mother who holds 
full-time job [sic] outside the home would earn an additional $85,939 for the work she does at home."); 
see also Silbaugh, supra note 38, at 118-19 (discussing divorce courts' failures to account for home 
work by women in dual-earner households). 
43 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c. ("The spousal contribution of domestic labor may 
not confer an equal financial benefit, but may have made it possible for the couple to raise children as 
well as accumulate property. One spouse may have contributed more than the other in emotional stabil-
ity, optimism, or social skills, and thereby enriched the marital life. Property may be the only thing left 
at dissolution for the court to divide, but it is not usually the only thing produced during the marriage. 
An equal allocation of the property at divorce might thus be grounded on a presumption that both 
spouses contributed significantly to the entire relationship whether or not they contributed equally to ac-
cumulation of property during it."). 
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ity in marriage.44 Thus, while the fifty-fifty rule may overcompensate or 
undercompensate spouses in different scenarios,45 faced with the difficulties 
in measuring true contribution, equal division functions as an appealing de-
fault,46 reflecting and reinforcing the ideal of equality in marriage.47 
Disagreements regarding how contributions should be measured not-
withstanding, the partnership theory, broadly conceived, treats marital earn-
ings as subject to division in order to ensure that both spouses are 
compensated for their labor. Breadwinners and homemakers are thus enti-
tled to a portion of marital property because they have earned it. 
B. The Separate Property Rule 
Because property acquired prior to marriage and gifts and bequests re-
ceived during marriage do not result from the fruits of spouses' labor during 
the marriage, partnership theory classifies them as external to the marriage. 
Preexisting property cannot possibly be conceived as a product of the joint 
marital endeavor and therefore assigning any part of it to the marriage 
would bestow a windfall on a nonowner spouse who contributed nothing to 
its acquisition. Gifts and bequests given to one of the spouses are by defini-
tion gratuitous rather than compensatory and do not therefore belong to the 
marriage as joint venture, but rather to the donee spouse individually.48 
Gifts and bequests are also separate out of respect for donors' intentions,49 
44 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law 
and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 396-97 (noting that the use of the partnership business metaphor 
has led to a more egalitarian reconstruction of marriage and family); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage 
Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 109-10 (1998) (arguing that monetary and 
nonmonetary contributions to marriage should be treated equally because wages and housework "are 
both expressions of affection as well as materially beneficial"); Singer, supra note 12, at 1114 (finding 
the investment partnership theory of marriage promising for achieving more equal and equitable results 
for women because it entitles women to an equal share of the fruits of the marriage). 45 Some commentators have complained that equal division has not translated into equal results, 
leaving women and their children with less than they deserve. See Singer, supra note 12, at 1113-14. 
46 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.09 cmt. c ("[T]he incommensurability of the spouses' non-
financial contributions frustrates any effort to attach monetary value to them. Faced with this measure-
ment difficulty, it may be sensible for the law to presume irrebuttably that the spouses contributed 
equally to their entire relationship."). 47 On equal division's "expressive function," see Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 97. 48 Such gifts may also be considered "lucrative" rather than "onerous." DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, su-
pra note 17, § 62. Onerous title refers to property acquired through a spouse's labor, industry, or other 
valuable consideration, such as money, services, performance of conditions, etc. Onerous title property 
is always community property. This reflects the concept that property acquired through the efforts or 
labor of a marital partner belongs to the marital partnership. Lucrative title, on the other hand, is prop-
erty acquired by gift, inheritance, or intestate succession. The donor's intention controls the classifica-
tion of property acquired by lucrative title. If the donor intends for both spouses to benefit from the gift, 
it is community property. Otherwise, the property remains separate. Id. 
49 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117. 
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particularly the common interest to keep property within one family's 
bloodline. 50 
The treatment of income from and appreciation of separate property is 
a source of much angst and debate as jurisdictional rules vary dramatically 
and some are too murky and untested to produce predictable results. 51 That 
said, many states focus on whether gains from separate property can be at-
tributed to the active labor, skill, or industry of either spouse. If so, they are 
likely to be deemed marital. If not-if the spouses were passive-the ac-
crued gains are likely to remain separate. 52 
III. RECONSIDERING THE SANCTITY OF SEPARATE PROPERTY 
A closer examination of the current classification system reveals that 
the labor-centered rule is inherently problematic. This Part first turns to the 
theoretical inconsistencies of the prevailing paradigm. The Part then shows 
that in practice, deviations from the partnership principle abound. These 
deviations reveal a latent ambivalence toward the principle itself and con-
firm that it is both indefensible and unworkable. 
A. Theoretical Inconsistencies 
The most fundamental flaw of the partnership theory is its presumption 
that all spouses are equally invested in the marriage as an economic joint 
venture. 53 But assuming that spouses with widely divergent extramarital 
wealth will be equally motivated to pursue remunerative work ignores hu-
man nature. Most people work for pay because they want the security and 
the freedom that money can buy. While some independently wealthy indi-
viduals translate their educational and other advantages into more wealth, 
5° For a historical account of the relationship between marriage and inheritance, see Gary, supra 
note I, at 571 ("Prior to this century, inheritance between spouses in Western Europe and the United 
States was rare. As Mary Ann Glendon explains, '(m]arriage was not seen as a reason for shifting fam-
ily wealth, especially land, from one blood line to another."' (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 239 (1989))). 
51 See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 reporter's notes cmt. a ("All community-property states 
agree that the increased value of separate property that results from marital labor is community property, 
while any 'natural increase' in the value of separate property remains separate. Even within a single 
state, however, inconsistent methods are used for the allocation of appreciation between these two clas-
sifications."); see also infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
52 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 cmt. c (explaining that the rule that income from and 
appreciation of separate property are marital to the extent they are attributable to either spouse's labor 
"has long been followed in community-property states and is increasingly the rule in the common-law 
states"). But see infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
53 As a legal matter, spouses are formally obligated to act in good faith with respect to marital prop-
erty. See, e.g., UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT§ 2(a), 9 U.L.A. 114 (1983) ("Each spouse shall act in good 
faith with respect to the other spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of the other 
spouse. This obligation may not be varied by a marital property agreement."). Spouses may be sanc-
tioned if they fail to act in good faith. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.10. These requirements, 
however, have no impact on the professional choices spouses make. 
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others are lulled-or crippled-by their inheritances into barely working at 
all.54 Even the hard-working wealthy are incentivized to be less risk averse 
than those without a safety net and to pour their energy into ventures that 
promise less steady and secure compensation than they might otherwise 
pursue. 
The partnership theory's labor-centered rule also presents line-drawing 
difficulties. The theory requires that all fruits of both spouses' labor belong 
to the couple as a unit; excluding gifts and inheritances from the marital pot 
defeats this principle. Pure gifts-gifts that are wholly motivated by altru-
ism-are rare. In fact, most "gifts" involve some expectation, however 
slight, of future reward or the satisfaction of an outstanding debt; they result 
from luck and from labor. 55 For instance, a spouse who receives a large in-
heritance from an aged parent thirty years into marriage may be receiving 
what is in substance compensation for years of caretaking. The injustice of 
classifying this "delayed compensation" as separate property would be es-
pecially stark where the donee spouse left a paying job to care for the par-
ent. Though community property doctrine has tried to grapple with this 
54 See ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 50, 56 (Edward 
C. Kirkland ed., 1962); Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children?, FORTUNE, 
Sept. 29, 1986, at 18; Posting of Mark Kleiman to The Reality-Based Community, http:// 
www .samefacts.com/archives/microeconomics _and _policy_ analysis _/2005/04/protecting_ heirs_ from_ 
uneamed_wealth_and_sloth.php (Apr. 17, 2005, 12:38 PST) ("People who have accumulated wealth 
rarely understand how much they damage their children by setting tht;m up so they don't need to do any-
thing."). 
These noneamers are often the daughters of wealthy couples. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM 
D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR 182 (1996) ("Daughters of wealthy couples tend not to have 
careers of their own ... [and] housewives have the highest propensity of all major occupational groups 
to receive inheritances as well as periodic financial gifts from their parents . . . . In fact, housewives are 
three times more likely to receive substantial inheritances from their parents than are adult children of 
the affiuent on average."). 
55 See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 
14 (W.O. Halls trans., W.W. Norton 1990) (1950) ("[E]verything-food, women, children, property, 
talismans, land, labour services, priestly functions, and ranks-is there for passing on, and for balancing 
accounts."); Mary Douglas, Foreword to MAUSS, supra, at vii, ix ('There are no free gifts; gift cycles 
engage persons in permanent commitments that articulate the dominant institutions."); Frantz & Dagan, 
supra note 10, at 117-18 ("In many contexts, gift exchange is implicitly reciprocal-gifts are given as 
payback for favors granted or in anticipation of favorable future treatment. Inheritances, too, may be 
shaped by labor-related factors, such as one child's willingness to care for her parents in their old age."); 
C.A. Gregory, Gifts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 524, 524 (John Eatwell 
et al. eds., 1987) ("Anthropologists stress that while gifts appear to be voluntary, disinterested and spon-
taneous, they are in fact obligatory and interested."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Ex-
change, 119 HARV. L. REv. 491, 497 (2005) ("Anthropologists have discovered that many economic 
assets are exchanged between intimates in the form of gifts. This practice of gift exchange, though, in-
volves at least implicit bargaining and self-interest in addition to altruism. Most gifts are given under 
some degree of social compulsion and with the expectation of receiving something of equivalent or 
greater value in return. The reciprocation of gifts-whether in the form of material goods and services 
or social rewards, such as higher social status-is virtually obligatory as a matter of social practice."). 
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line-drawing difficulty,56 most gifts and bequests remain presumptively 
separate, and inquiries into unspoken exchange expectations surrounding 
wealth transfer, especially within families, are rare. 
A similar line-drawing difficulty applies to the proper classification of 
marital earnings. Earned wealth is hardly ever the result of labor alone; it is 
almost always attributable in part to pure luck. Most professional achieve-
ments depend on any number of factors predating marriage: gender, race, 
nationality, genetic talents, education, cultural fluency, childhood upbring-
ing, previous employment experiences, and connections. The currency that 
greases the wheels of professional success may also come in the form of fa-
vors that are essentially "gifts"-some of which may be received during 
marriage. Examples include the friend of the family who gives someone 
her first job, the former roommate who reveals the inside scoop before a 
critical interview, and the mentor who pushes someone's application into 
the right pile. The partnership theory does not-indeed, cannot-decouple 
these gift-like aspects from property derived from labor. 
On the flip side, marital earnings alone may under-represent the true 
accumulation during the marriage, as is the case where one spouse, often 
the wife, forgoes career opportunities so that the husband can maximize his. 
In such instances, the most valuable asset generated during marriage may be 
the husband's enhanced earning capacity. Since this earning capacity will 
continue to bear fruit after the marriage ends, many commentators believe it 
should be accounted for at divorce. 57 
A pure (but administratively unworkable) application of the labor-
centered rule would recharacterize those portions of gifts that are attribut-
able to effort as marital property and those portions of earnings attributable 
to unearned privilege as separate property. It might also impose a type of 
"endowment tax" on born-rich dilettantes-requiring them to make up for 
their lack of earnings based on a gauge of their unused earning capacity-
and add career assets acquired in the course of marriage to the marital prop-
erty pot. 
56 See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 157--60 (discussing the classification of remunera-
tory gifts). 
57 Some commentators-but only one jurisdiction (New York}-have recognized that the current 
cutoff date for earnings attributable to the marriage does not accurately reflect the true accumulation of 
wealth from the marriage. Not only do professional degrees acquired during marriage often represent a 
joint investment by the parties, but as a conceptual matter, a much broader category of earnings pro-
jected to materialize after divorce may have accrued during the marriage-e.g., developing a patent, 
composing a symphony, training for the Olympics, starting a business. For discussions of the proper 
treatment of"career assets," i.e., enhancements to spouses' careers that occur during-and often by vir-
tue of-marriage, see Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and 
Middle Class, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 ( 1997); Singer, supra note 12; Jana Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Hu-
man Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit, 31 F AM. L.Q. 119 ( 1997); Brett R. Turner, Goodwill and Spousal 
Support, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J., June 2005, at 61; Brett R. Turner, Why New York May Be Mov-
ing Away from Treating Professional Degrees as Marital Property (and Why Attorneys in Other States 
Should Care), DIVORCE LITIG., July 2004, at 128. 
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In addition to these line-drawing difficulties, a faithful application of 
the retroactive contract approach (designing divorce law based on an ap-
proximation of what the parties would have negotiated in advance) would 
likely demand that a portion of preexisting, gifted, and devised property be 
classified as maritat58 Note also that most states' intestate succession 
schemes leave a significant portion of all of the decedent's estate to the sur-
viving spouse without regard to how or when it was acquired.59 These 
schemes reflect legislatures' presumption that most people would leave at 
least some of their separate property to their spouse had they executed a 
will.60 
Finally, once the classification process is complete, the two existing 
approaches to the division of marital property are also problematic. Case-
by-case estimations of relative contribution and need are highly subjective, 
tend to undervalue women's nonmonetary contributions, and produce much 
uncertainty. Equal division, on the other hand, is too blunt an instrument if 
the goal is to allocate the fruits of each spouse's labor according to his or 
her "true" contribution. In the case of spouses who contribute unequal 
amounts of labor to the marriage, the equal division rule gives lesser con-
tributing spouses a free lunch. The equal division rule is especially unfair 
from a labor-centered perspective where both spouses earn significantly dif-
ferent amounts and there are no children. It also misses its mark where both 
spouses earn comparable amounts and where one spouse also shoulders 
most of the housework and childrearing. In such cases, equal division un-
dercompensates the primary caregiver, who effectively holds two jobs.61 
B. Deviations in Practice 
Given these theoretical inconsistencies, it should come as no surprise 
that in practice, the application of the labor-centered principle is anything 
but straightforward. A number of doctrines and trends indicate that in fact, 
some separate property is often included in the pot of money subject to di-
vision at divorce. Thomas Oldham has criticized the liberal use of some of 
58 Lifshitz, supra note 26, at 729-30 (suggesting that nonpropertied spouses often rely on their part-
ners' premarital and unearned wealth); see also infra Part Ill. C. 
59 Gary, supra note I, at 572-73 ("In a 1978 survey, a majority of respondents stated they would 
give all their property to their spouse, even if they were survived by children of the marriage, parents, or 
siblings. Intestacy statutes, which purport to dispose of a decedent's property in the manner desired by 
most people, increasingly give the surviving spouse either a substantial share or all of the decedent's es-
tate. Thus, inheritance by a surviving spouse of all of the decedent spouse's property, either by will or 
by intestacy, is common."). 
60 See JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 62, 65 (2d ed. 2003) ("Many legislators and 
scholars have concluded that the intestate succession statute should aim to give effect to the probable 
intent of the decedent . . . . [W]hen testators write wills, they typically leave all or most of their estates 
to their spouses . . . . So, legislators assume, decedents who don't write wills would also want their 
spouses to take the bulk of their estates."). 
61 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing judicial discretion to deviate from equal di-
vision). 
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these doctrines for "undercut[ting] the marital property system."62 But in 
light of the inconsistencies discussed above, the deviations from the princi-
ple may be better understood as safety valves through which the system lets 
off the steam generated by the internal tension of an incoherent paradigm. 63 
For example, many states begin the classification process with a pre-
sumption that all property owned by either spouse at divorce is marital 
property. The burden is on the separate property holder to prove that the 
property in question did not result from labor performed during the mar-
riage, but rather is traceable to separate property.64 Many states recognize 
the transmutation of separate property into marital property where separate 
and marital funds have been commingled,65 and a few states allow for 
transmutation where separate property was used by both parties ("transmu-
tation by use"66 or "transmutation by implied agreement"67), especially in 
cases in which the spouses' marital home was acquired with separate 
funds. 68 Though no state has adopted the ALI's recommendation for a 
bright-line rule transmuting an increasing percentage of separate property 
into marital property based on the length of the marriage,69 several states do 
take the length of the marriage into account at the margins of existing doc-
trines.70 Lottery winnings, the ultimate luck-generated property, are gener-
ally classified as marital/' though not necessarily if they can be attributed to 
a winning ticket purchased with separate funds. 72 
62 Oldham, supra note I, at 248. 63 See id. at 248--49 ("[Some courts] seem more inclined to find a spouse's intent to make a gift of 
separate property to the marital estate, more willing to find a commingled account uncommingleable, 
and more disposed to discovering an intention to transmute separate property to marital property. What 
can explain this? These courts may question the fairness of the marital property system. A court can 
significantly expand the scope of the divisible marital estate by creative use of the notions of commin-
gling and transmutation." (emphasis added)). 
64 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03[1]; Oldham, supra note I, at 222. 65 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03; Oldham, supra note I, at 221-33, 247--48. 66 See Oldham, supra note I, at 246-47. 67 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.02[2]. 68 See id. § 11.02[2] n.l8; Brett R. Turner, Marital Home Update, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J., 
Apr. 2005, at 37 (noting a series of cases that recognize that the marital home is not always property of 
the marriage, but considering the circumstances under which the home can be transmuted into marital 
property); Brett R. Turner, Unlikely Partners: The Marital Home and the Concept of Separate Property, 
20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 69 (2006). 69 See infra Part Ili.C. 
70 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03 ("Courts sometimes reimburse the spouse's separate prop-
erty that was commingled if the parties divorce after a short marriage."). 
71 See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 748 A.2d 1031, 1041 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (finding that various 
bank and brokerage accounts held solely in the husband's name were marital property because the assets 
were purchased with lottery winnings); Damon v. Damon, 823 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2006) (holding that proceeds from a winning lottery ticket acquired during marriage constituted marital 
property); Campbell v. Campbell, 213 A.D.2d 1027, 1027 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) ("Courts have univer-
sally held that the proceeds of a winning lottery ticket acquired by a spouse during the marriage consti-
tute marital property." (citations omitted)); Parker v. Parker, 766 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
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As mentioned above, many states classify income from and apprecia-
tion of separate property as marital only to the extent they are attributable to 
either spouse's labor. This approach requires that gains from separate prop-
erty be allocated into two parts-one part attributable to labor and another 
attributable to the separate capital's "natural" growth, with only the former 
part becoming marital property. But, as the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution explain, allocations of this sort are inherently difficult 
and states that follow this labor-centered rule "have been inconsistent in 
both their choice and application of the allocation method."73 Other states' 
treatment of gains from separate property, however, deviates from the la-
bor-centered principle. Some treat all income from separate property as 
marital/4 attributing to the marriage property that may be the result of luck, 
and creating an artificial incentive to invest in non-income-producing as-
sets.75 Others rule that enhancements to the value of separate property are 
not marital if they were generated by the spouse who owns the separate 
2003) ("The Jaw is well settled that a lottery prize won during a marriage is generally considered prop-
erty acquired during the marriage subject to equitable distribution." (citations omitted)); Thomas v. 
Thomas, 579 S.E.2d 310, 311 n.3 (S.C. 2003) (noting that the lower court correctly found the lottery 
winnings to be marital property). 
72 Most sources dealing with the classification of lottery proceeds refer to cases in which the win-
ning ticket was purchased out of marital funds. Authority on windfalls traceable to separate property is 
sparse, but cases and secondary sources imply that they would be classified as separate. See In re Mar-
riage of Mahaffey, 564 N.E.2d 1300, 1301 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding as most significant the undis-
puted evidence that the money used to purchase the winning ticket came from marital earnings and the 
right to receive payments became irrevocable during marriage); OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 5.03[6] ("If 
the spouse wins the lottery during marriage by purchasing a lottery ticket with marital funds, the pro-
ceeds ... should be marital."). But see Dixon v. Sanderson, 10 S.W. 535, 536 (Tex. 1888) (holding that 
lottery proceeds from a winning ticket the wife purchased with her separate property were community 
property because the prize "came as the fortuitous result of a contract based on valuable consideration 
paid, and is but the profit on a venture, which like other profit, not resulting from the increased value of 
a thing bought with the separate means of one party to the marital union, becomes the common property 
of the husband and wife"). See generally Katie Foster, Comment, Dividing Lottery Winnings During 
Dissolution of Marriage, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 357 (2003) (explaining how a state's prop-
erty regime (community or separate), timing of winning and disbursements, and other factors affect the 
divisibility of lottery winnings at divorce); Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Division of Lottery Proceeds in 
Divorce Proceedings, 124 A.L.R.5th 537 (2004). 73 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.05 reporter's notes cmt.b. The ALI describes the two methods 
as follows: "One method, akin to a quantum meruit approach, values the labor input by reference to pre-
vailing compensation rates, and attributes all remaining gain to capital. The other method values the 
capital input by reference to ordinary rates of return, and attributes all the remaining gain to labor." !d. 
§ 4.05 cmt. b. Both methods, however, often produce arbitrary results. See id. § 4.05 cmt. b, at 669-70, 
reporter's notes cmt. b, at 681. 
74 See id. § 4.04 cmt. a ("Most community-property states follow the 'American rule' under which 
both income and appreciation retain the separate-property character of the underlying asset, but a minor-
ity follow some version of the 'Spanish rule' under which the income is community. The common-Jaw 
states are more difficult to classify because their Jaw on this question is not as well developed, but [as a] 
general pattern, ... many, if not most, follow the 'American rule."'). 
75 This incentive may ultimately be detrimental to both parties if the investments fail to maximize 
the profits from the property. 
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property, thus excluding from the marital pot property that, according to the 
partnership logic, should be included in it.76 The treatment of income from 
and appreciation of separate property is thus especially illustrative of the 
law's half-hearted embrace of the labor-centered paradigm. 
Once the classification process is complete, some equitable distribution 
statutes specifically direct judges to take separate property into account in 
the division of marital property.77 Some statutes allow courts to consider78 
depletion of separate property for marital purposes.79 Additionally, as we 
have seen, while some states direct judges to take contribution into account 
at the distribution stage, others dilute this principle with other factors or re-
ject it altogether by imposing an equal division rule. In one divorce case, 
for example, a self-made multibillionaire argued that his wife should not be 
entitled to half of the fortune he accumulated during their twenty-eight year 
marriage because it was attributable not only to his efforts but primarily to 
his "genius." Implicitly, he was arguing that a large part of his earnings 
were the result of an attribute inherent to him that he had possessed from 
birth-the ultimate luck-generated property. The court ruled that the hus-
band's earnings were marital property and divided them equally between 
76 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.04 reporter's notes cmt. c ("While the principle of a com-
munity of labor is central to the community-property system, its reception in the common-law states has 
been uneasy, even after decades of equitable-distribution reforms. Section 14 of the Uniform Marital 
Property Act provides a recent example. This section establishes a marital-property interest in separate 
capital when the capital's value is enhanced by the labor of the other spouse, but not where the value is 
enhanced by the labor of the spouse who owns the separate capital. The language of both the section 
and its commentary suggest the drafters' view that one spouse must provide a substantial labor input in 
order to 'earn' a share in the appreciation of the other's separate capital; the labor of the spousal owner 
of the separate property creates no similar entitlement by his spouse. It is thus apparent that while 
UMPA follows many community-property principles and is often described as a community-property 
law, as to marital labors it adopts a conception that departs from the fundamental community-property 
view that marriage assumes a commitment of all one's labors to the benefit of the marital community."). 
For further discussion of the difficulty in allocating increases in the value of separate property according 
to spouses' labor, see David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The American Law Institute's 
Recommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 176, 
188-89 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006). 
77 See MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY§ 19.09 
(2007) ("[S]ome jurisdictions specifically direct that the court consider as a factor in making equitable 
distribution the value of any separate property set apart to the parties."); FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 16, § 37.06; OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 13.02[1]; Shapo, supra note 21, at 712-13 ("Several 
community property states ... permit equitable division of community property at divorce if one spouse 
would suffer economic hardship because of unusual circumstances, or if there are 'compelling reasons' 
to do so, and almost all also permit payments for support."). 
78 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.10. 
79 ASIMOW ET AL., supra note 77, § 19.09 n.3; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(d) (2007) 
(providing that a court may consider as a factor depletion of separate property for marital purposes); see 
also Hayes v. Hayes, 792 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the fact that a spouse's 
separate property was contributed to the acquisition of marital property or used for marital living ex-
penses was a permissible factor to consider in dividing property); Zacharek v. Zacharek, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
625,626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
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the spouses.80 Additionally, some "hybrid" states follow the general rule 
that only marital funds are subject to distribution, but permit the invasion of 
separate funds where severe hardship would otherwise result. 81 
Outside of the divorce context, some jurisdictions' spousal disinheri-
tance laws blatantly contradict the labor-centered principle. Community 
property states maintain the distinction between community and separate 
property at death; surviving spouses are entitled to fifty percent of the prop-
erty accumulated through labor during the marriage, and deceased spouses' 
estates include the remaining fifty percent, not more. 82 But in some non-
community property states83 and under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code,84 
the property subject to the elective share or "forced share"-the property 
reachable by a disinherited spouse-includes all of the testator's property. 
In these states, disinherited surviving spouses may, depending on the cir-
cumstances, receive more by electing against a will than they would at di-
vorce under labor-centered partnership principles. On the other hand, in 
some cases surviving spouses may be left with less than they "deserve" un-
der partnership principles--e.g., where the survivor is entitled to less than 
one-half of the decedent's estate and where this entire estate is composed of 
80 deCastro v. deCastro, 616 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Mass. 1993). 
81 See Oldham, supra note I, at 219. 
82 See Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 97-
98 (1994) ("Because equal ownership of all community property is recognized prior to the death of ei-
ther spouse, the need for a forced or elective share is eliminated. The survivor retains her separate prop-
erty and her one-half interest in the community property, while the decedent's separate property and his 
one-half interest in the community property pass pursuant to his will or through intestacy."). 
83 See, e.g., Harriet Newman Cohen, To Have or Have Not (A Prenuptial Agreement), N.Y. L.J., 
Aug. 7, 2006, at 9, 12 (2006) ("[In New York, u]nlike divorce law, estate law does not distinguish be-
tween separate and marital property. Therefore, unless a prenuptial agreement provides otherwise, a 
surviving spouse will inherit not only 'marital' property, but 'separate' property as well. This is also 
true in more seasoned marriages when 'marital' property is insufficient to satisfy the elective share."); 
Gary, supra note I, at 592-93 (1995) ("[T]he Delaware [elective share] statute is based solely on the 
decedent's estate. There is no attempt to base the elective share on marital property, no attempt to in-
clude marital property held in the surviving spouse's name, and no attempt to exclude the decedent's 
separate property."). 
84 UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2-203, 8 U.L.A. 103-04 (amended 1993). Note however that the UPC's 
scheme, while not technically faithful to the partnership theory, was aimed at allocating to the surviving 
spouse only labor-generated property. See id. at art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 93, 95 ("The redes-
igned elective share is intended to bring elective share law into line with the partnership theory of mar-
riage."). The drafters conceded that a community property model was theoretically ideal, but they 
decided it was unworkable because of tracing problems. They also rejected a discretionary equitable 
distribution-style scheme as inappropriate because the deceased spouse would not be present to protect 
her interests and because of its unpredictable nature. Instead, the UPC drafters devised an "accrual-
type" elective share. The surviving spouse would be entitled to a gradually increasing percentage of the 
augmented estate which would include all of the testator's property, starting from zero after one year 
and increasing to fifty percent after fifteen years of the marriage. Because the augmented estate includes 
both marital and separate property, the scheme aims to approximate a partnership-type result by presum-
ing that the portion of the augmented estate attributable to joint efforts will grow over the course of the 
marriage. See Waggoner, supra note 21; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and 
Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 7610WA L. REV. 223 (1991). 
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property earned in the course of the marriage. 85 Thus, commentators who 
support the labor-centered paradigm complain that schemes like the UPC's 
"fail ... to apply the marital partnership theory."86 
C. Existing Proposals 
Despite these tensions, most authorities hold fast to the labor-centered 
partnership concept. Recently, however, scholars Carolyn Frantz and 
Hanoch Dagan have offered an alternative, explicitly arguing that "labor 
should not be the standard for inclusion in the marital estate."87 Instead, 
they suggest a temporal standard for inclusion of some separate property in 
the marital pot. A similar scheme, which itself informed Frantz and Da-
gan's, can be found in section 4.12 of the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution.88 
The ALI and the Frantz-Dagan models recharacterize a gradually in-
creasing percentage of preexisting property as marital based on the length 
of the marriage. In the case of gifts and inheritances received during mar-
riage, the ALI and Frantz and Dagan diverge. The ALI recommends that 
the duration of the marriage as well as the time since the property's re-
ceipt-the "holding period"-determine the recharacterized percentage.89 
This ensures, for example, that even in long-term marriages, property inher-
ited on the eve of divorce will remain separate. Frantz and Dagan, by con-
trast, believe that gifts and inheritances received during marriage should be 
classified as marital based not only on the length of the marriage, but also 
on the duration of the relationship between the donor and donee, regardless 
of how long the gift has been held. Under their scheme, each gift or inheri-
85 See Rosenbury, supra note I (surveying differences between state defaults regarding distribution 
of property at divorce and protections against spousal disinheritance); Waggoner, supra note 21, at 48-
49 (illustrating cases in which the traditional elective share overcompensates and undercompensates the 
surviving spouses as compared with the fifty-fifty partnership principle). 
86 Gary, supra note I, at 589 ("The drafters of the 1990 UPC sought to use the fifteen-year phase-in 
provision to confront the problem of including nonmarital property in the augmented estate. Although 
the phase-in may help in some cases, the arbitrary nature of the formula fails to solve the problem. Un-
der many scenarios, the resulting elective share amount will not equal one-half of the marital property. 
For example, property owned by spouses married five years could be entirely marital property. On the 
· other hand, property could be substantially separate if it was owned by spouses who began a fifteen-year 
marriage after or near retirement. Another way in which the 1990 UPC fails to apply the marital part-
nership theory is in its treatment of an independently wealthy surviving spouse. The ... approach of the 
UPC means that separate assets of both spouses are included in the estate to which the elective share 
percentage is applied. Separate assets of the surviving spouse are then charged against that spouse's 
elective share amount. The result is that a spouse who has contributed a lifetime of energy and work in 
amassing a couple's marital estate may be denied any part of that property if the value of that spouse's 
independent wealth is greater than that of the marital estate."); see also Charles H. Whitebread, The Uni-
form Probate Code's Nod to the Partnership Theory of Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 
II PROB. L.J. 125 (1992). 
87 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117. 
88 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12. 
89 Jd. § 4.12(2). 
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tance would be multiplied by the ratio that the length of the marriage bears 
to the relationship between the donor and donee. The result is the amount 
that is deemed marital property. Thus, for example, "[i]n the case of a gift 
from a parent to a child who is fifty-two years old, and who has been mar-
ried eight years, 8/52 (or 2113) of the gift's value should be marital prop-
erty."90 This formula is designed to determine the "extent to which a gift 
reflects a relationship cultivated during marriage."91 The remaining eleven-
thirteenths in the same example would be separate because they are attrib-
utable to a relationship cultivated before the marriage. 
Both the ALI and Frantz and Dagan justify a standard centered on 
length of marriage by reference to spouses' likely intent and expectations. 
The ALI reporters explain: 
[An underlying premise of the rule] is that a spousal sense that property is 
communally rather than individually owned has its source in the relationship 
of the parties, and marital duration provides an administrable measure of that 
relationship that can be used absent special circumstances. The more inter-
twined the spouses lives have become, the more readily they will expect to 
share one another's good or bad fortune .... A sense of communal ownership 
will develop more rapidly for separate assets received in the 25th year of mar-
riage than in the fifth. 92 
In Frantz and Dagan's words: 
[Transmutation of separate property] reflects the reality of marriage-many 
spouses do in fact intend to give some of their separate property to the com-
munity while it exists. This is due, we think, to two phenomena: the moral 
imperative to share all one has with a loved one in financial need (for instance, 
a spouse who refuses to pay for the costs of a medical crisis out of separate 
property has failed in the duties of love), and the fact that, over time, spouses 
feel less need and less desire to guard against the possibility of divorce and 
remarriage. For the latter reason, we agree with the ALI ... that the length of 
the marriage is in general a good proxy for intent to transmute separate prop-
erty.93 
Because both proposals are rooted in the parties' presumed intent and ex-
pectations, both allow property owners to opt out of the rule.94 At the same 
9° Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 118 n.l95. 91 !d. at 118; see also id. at 117-18 ("Gifts and inheritances reflect marital good fortune or labor 
performed during marriage, but they do so only partially. Both the luck and the labor may precede the 
marriage. This is particularly true of gifts or inheritances from family members who have had lifelong 
relationships with the donee far exceeding the length of the marriage."). 
92 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 cmt. b, at 772; see also id. § 4.12 cmt. a, at 771; id. § 4.12 
reporter's notes cmt. a, at 781-82. 
93 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 114-15. 94 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 cmt. a ("[The effect of the rule] is to establish that spouses 
who live together for many years commit at least some of their resources to one another, in a proportion 
that increases with the duration of their relationship, unless there is good reason to think that they did 
not intend that result." (emphasis added)); Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 115 ("Of course, spouses 
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time, Frantz and Dagan retain the doctrine of transmutation by use.95 Thus, 
even where a propertied spouse has explicitly communicated that he or she 
does not intend to transmute separate property, if it was used by both 
spouses during marriage-such as with a marital home-such property is 
classified as entirely marital, with the original owner having a right of first 
purchase. The ALI is silent on transmutation by use. Thus, where a valid 
opt-out exists and the parties share separate property, the property would 
likely retain its separate character.96 
While these approaches improve upon a blanket exclusion of unearned 
and premarital property from the marital pot, and while they correctly focus 
on the duration of the marriage as one of the keys to a more rational para-
digm, they are incomplete. The suggestion that separate property be re-
characterized as marital based on the length of the marriage relies on an 
assumption that as marriages last longer, spouses' expectations that their 
union should translate into a merger of financial interests grow stronger. 
While this may be so, the precise relationship between marriage duration 
and sharing expectations will vary from one couple to the next, as well as 
within each marital unit.97 It is therefore unsurprising that the ALI and 
Frantz and Dagan include only a rough· suggestion regarding how the 
gradually increasing percentage should be set.98 Ultimately, the formula can 
should be allowed to easily and unilaterally opt out of this default rule."). The ALI allows unilateral 
opt-out only with respect to gifts and inheritances received during marriage. For premarital assets to 
remain separate, both parties must enter a premarital agreement. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, 
§ 4.12 cmt. c, at 776-77. That said, section 4.12(6) preserves the separate property owner's interests if 
"necessary to avoid substantial injustice." This provision, in combination with the italicized language 
above, implies that unilateral opt-out might be respected were the rules put into effect. See also Lifshitz, 
supra note 26, at 734 (suggesting that spouses with premarital or unearned assets should bear the burden 
of notifYing their partner of their intention to keep such property separate and that absent such notifica-
tion, the nonpropertied spouse may be entitled to "reliance damages"). 
95 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10 at 116 ("[T]here is one circumstance where property should be 
transmuted regardless of intent-when items are used during marriage."). 
96 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12. 
97 The ALI's reporter's notes themselves acknowledge the tenuous basis for the ALI's proposed ap-
proach. See id. § 4.12 reporter's notes cmt. a ("Data on what spouses actually expect in their marriage 
are sparse, so this section necessarily rests on assumptions about those expectations. Of course, assump-
tions are required regardless of how the issue addressed by this section is resolved. . . . The data suggest 
that economic decisions made during marriage are largely premised on the assumption that the marriage 
will continue, which is a premise of this section. Another premise of this section, that after 30 or 35 
years of marriage most people will expect that property their spouses brought into the marriage will be 
available to them jointly upon retirement or in an emergency, remains untested. However, the courts of 
hotchpot states may share this assumption, for they appear more likely to allocate inherited or premarital 
property to the other spouse at the dissolution of a lengthy marriage than at the dissolution of a short 
one." (citations omitted)). 
98 The only parameter offered by the ALI concerning premarital property is that the recharacterized 
portion increases over time from zero in the case of short (two- or three-year) marriages to one hundred 
percent in the case of thirty- to thirty-five-year marriages. /d. § 4.12 cmt. b, at 773. The recharacteriza-
tion of gifts and inheritances received during marriage is addressed in section 4.12(2), which provides: 
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only match expectations if it is determined on a case-by-case basis. How 
long must a marriage last for twenty-five percent of premarital property to 
belong to the couple? A standard scheme is bound to seem arbitrary from 
within a given relationship. 
Frantz and Dagan's suggestion that a portion of gifts and devises 
should be classified as marital based on the length of the marriage and the 
length of the donor-donee relationship is also problematic. If, as they 
claim, the classification of premarital property should be based on length of 
marriage regardless of how the property was acquired, why should gifts and 
inheritances received during marriage be treated differently? Why, for ex-
ample, should a spouse who inherits $1 million one day before the wedding 
have to contribute a different amount to the marital pot than a spouse who 
receives the same amount one day after the wedding? Why should a spouse 
who receives a gift from a lifelong friend have to contribute less than one 
who receives the same amount from a recently "cultivated" relationship? 
Donor intent cannot explain the difference because preexisting property-to 
which Frantz and Dagan apply the length-of-marriage formula-may also 
include gifts and inheritances. Additionally, Frantz and Dagan themselves 
acknowledge that donor intent should not be dispositive in the classification 
of gifts as marital or separate.99 They explicitly reject the labor-centered 
classification standard and argue that gifts reflect luck as well as labor, yet 
their classification of gifts and inheritances as marital only to the extent 
they "reflect[] a relationship cultivated during marriage"100 echoes the old 
paradigm that they purportedly reject. A gift or inheritance that is truly 
viewed by all parties-donor, donee, and donee's spouse-as external to 
the marriage should be designated as such through explicit agreement. The 
default rule, if Frantz and Dagan's own principles are followed, should 
classify property based on its prospective meaning to the spouses, not on its 
source. 
In sum, both the ALI's and Frantz and Dagan's proposals attribute to 
the marriage a portion of property currently classified as separate, but nei-
ther method provides a concrete answer to the question of how much pre-
marital or unearned wealth should be shared in marriage. 101 Length of the 
A portion of separate property acquired by each spouse during marriage should be recharacter-
ized at dissolution as marital property if, at the time of dissolution, both the marital duration, and 
the time since the property's acquisition (the "holding period"), exceed the minimum length speci-
fied for each in a rule of statewide application. 
(a) The percentage of separate property that is recharacterized as marital property under Para-
graph (2) should be determined by a formula, specified in a rule of statewide application, that 
takes into account both the marital duration and the holding period of the property in question. 
(b) The formula should specify a marital duration and holding period at which the full value of 
the property is recharacterized at dissolution as marital property. 
/d. § 4.12(2). 
99 See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117; see also infra Part IV. 
10° Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 118. 
101 For a further critique of section 4.12 of the ALI Principles, see Westfall, supra note 76, at 956-
58. 
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marriage and holding period on their own do not translate into a nonarbi-
trary recharacterization amount. Moreover, looking to the length of the do-
nor-donee relationship takes a step backwards, returning to the flawed 
labor-centered paradigm. 
IV. BEYOND THE LABOR-CENTERED PARADIGM 
As we have seen, the current marital property classification system is 
neither sound in theory nor followed strictly in practice. But while trans-
mutation and other doctrines mean that the labor-centered rule is followed 
only partially, they result in tremendous uncertainty regarding the likely 
outcome of any given divorce. The discretionary application of many of 
these deviations also creates the impression that divorce decisions are arbi-
trary and unfair. Some doctrines also create an incentive for spouses to 
keep property separate and to share as little as possible unless they are pre-
pared to allow the entire property in question to be characterized as marital. 
The "excuses" for attributing separate property to the marriage employed by 
the doctrinal deviations seem like just that-excuses for overriding a seem-
ingly sacred principle. The problem is the principle itself. 
A. Marriage as Merger of Risk and Reward 
I. The Risk and Reward Paradigm.-Fortunately, the kernels of a 
more coherent recharacterization approach are contained in two aspects of 
Frantz and Dagan's overarching theory of marriage to which they give short 
shrift in their discussion of preexisting, gifted, and inherited property. First, 
they argue that one of the unique and essential characteristics of marriage is 
its communal dimension. Specifically, marriage fuses spouses' interests 
such that "what is good for one spouse must affect what is good for the 
other."102 "[S]pouses," the authors explain, "perceive themselves at least 
partially as a 'we,' a plural subject, that is in turn a constitutive feature of 
each spouse's identity as an 'I. "'103 Central to this view of the communal 
aspect of marriage is the notion that "sharing life and its projects requires 
spouses to pool their efforts and their rewards, 'each operating on joint be-
half of both. "'104 Spouses do not view collective benefits such as pooling of 
resources and economies of scale in a mercenary way as individuals might 
in a nonintimate partnership context, but rather as benefits that accrue to the 
unit as a whole. "Sharing the advantages of life together as well as its diffi-
culties is the linchpin of [the marital] community."105 
102 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 82. 
103 /d. 
104 /d. at 83 (quoting Simon Gardner, Rethinking Family Propeny, 109 LAW Q. REv. 263, 283 
(1993)). 
105 !d. at 82. 
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Second, Frantz and Dagan believe that spouses are expected to make 
roughly comparable contributions to the marriage. That said, these contri-
butions need not have comparable market values. What is critical is 
spouses' commitment to long-term reciprocity of effort and personal in-
vestment.106 Another central pillar of Frantz and Dagan's ideal of marriage 
is the principle of equality. "[I]t would be perverse," they write, "to con-
ceive of a marriage ... where one spouse has a recognized controlling in-
terest in the property that partially constitutes the marriage, and, 
correspondingly, in marital decisions .... As subordination in marriage is 
a threat to a spouse's basic personhood, the marital community must be 
bounded by a commitment to equality."107 
Extrapolating from these ideas, I posit that marriage at its core should 
be understood as a commitment by spouses not only to labor for the unit, 
but also to share more broadly in the opportunities and vulnerabilities that 
characterize who they are financially for the duration of their union. As 
Milton Regan put it, by marrying, "[s]pouses agree in essence to pool their 
risks in face of an uncertain future." 108 Money shapes our identities in fun-
damental ways. It determines where we live, the kind of work we do, and 
the level of medical care we receive. 109 Money and money worries play a 
central role in our sense of safety or danger, possibility or constraint, peace 
or anxiety. Sharing risks and rewards enables spouses to combine these 
core elements of their individual identities during marriage. 
This theory of marriage as a merger of risk and reward is consistent 
with widely held contract-based and normative intuitions. Most Americans 
assume that marriage turns separate individuals into a risk-sharing unit. 
Most people would also agree that requiring only workers to share is unfair. 
What, then, does the merger of risk and reward translate into? Mar-
riage as merger of risk and reward clearly supports the sharing of earnings. 
Earnings are power. Earnings shape one's sense of security, freedom, and 
opportunity, influencing decisions that in a marriage necessarily impact 
both spouses-whether and when to have children, what type of schooling 
and healthcare they will receive, where to live, and how much money 
should be set aside for emergencies. Allowing the high-earning spouse to 
106 /d. at 89-90 ("Communal marriage does not require that a spouse accept an arrangement where 
she is being exploited, expected to expend a disproportionate amount of effort, and yet reaping relatively 
little in the way of reward. There are, in other words, limits to acceptable asymmetric contribution 
within the ideal of communal marriage. But these limits are not based on the metric of desert for labor 
in the sense of each spouse insisting upon receiving benefits in proportion to individual market-valued 
contribution. Instead, marriage operates on a metric focused on individual effort. Though the joint en-
deavor need not be the product of similar market contributions, it should be the product of similar per-
sonal investments in the success of the marital endeavor." (emphasis added)). 
107 /d. at 9 I. 
108 
REGAN, supra note t, at 147. 
109 For a poignant account of the relationship between wealth and health, see Janny Scott, Life at the 
Top in America Isn't Just Better, It's Longer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,2005, at AI. 
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retain earnings separately would go against the heart of the notion that mar-
riage means a joining of lots. 
Before addressing the concrete implications of this view of marriage as 
a union of risks and rewards, it should be noted that although the main flaw 
of the current paradigm is its exclusive focus on contributions of labor, this 
is not to say that spouses do not presently conceive of the fruits of marital 
labor as a joint endeavor. They often do. But the lens through which 
spouses view "contribution" is not exclusively tied to labor; it is broader. 
In marriage, contribution includes many things that go beyond the pooling 
of work and earnings. Spouses who are a good team set aside their individ-
ual preferences for the benefit of one another, making sacrifices that from a 
purely monetary perspective may seem wasteful: they move to new cities so 
their partner can take a job that is more rewarding, they take up hobbies 
they would otherwise happily live without, they tend to in-laws, they 
change their religious affiliation, they confront their demons, they compro-
mise. Marriage works when spouses engage in a carefully calibrated dance 
that leaves both partners feeling safe and valued. 
A key ingredient of fairness between husbands and wives is their will-
ingness to make relatively similar sacrifices for the benefit of the collective 
unit. While Frantz and Dagan are correct that striking a fair balance in 
these sacrifices-or "personal investments"-is necessarily subjective to 
each couple, it is not true that all such sacrifices are impossible to measure 
and enforce externally. A breadwinning husband may contribute to mar-
riage in any number of unquantifiable ways, but his wages are clearly quan-
tifiable elements of his financial capability during marriage, and as such, 
they are properly classified as marital at divorce. A spouse who owns pre-
marital or gifted property also has a clearly quantifiable degree of financial 
capability during marriage. Exempting this capability from the marital 
community is inconsistent with the view of marriage as an all-for-one 
proposition. 
On its face, the view of marriage as merger of risk and reward implies 
that sharing should be total, however and whenever property is acquired. If 
marriage truly represents a complete fusion-an identity of interests, risks, 
and aspirations-allowing spouses to retain extramarital wealth cuts against 
the very heart of the notion that they have thrown their lots together. Frantz 
and Dagan acknowledge this but reject a complete merger rule on expedi-
ency grounds, arguing that the reality of multiple marriages would render it 
unfair and unworkable. Total merger would privilege first spouses and 
their children over propertied individuals' subsequent families. As the au-
thors put it: 
If preexisting property were included in the marital community, the first mar-
riage would be privileged over others that may come later. The first spouse 
would share not only the fruits of the marriage, but also the fruits of the other 
spouse's premarital activities. To avoid the complete colonization of a 
spouse's life, thus penalizing subsequent marriages, law must acknowledge the 
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possibility, however undesirable, that the period of marriage (and thus sharing) 
may come to an end. Therefore, spouses should be expected to share the bene-
fits and burdens of their life together, not those of their lives before ... the ex-
istence of the marital community. 110 
But this concession to reality lacks conviction. Rather, I suggest that a 
total merger of all property is wrong in principle, because marriage commits 
spouses to share upside and downside potential only so long as they are 
married. 111 Even where neither party remarries, after divorce the paths of 
ex-spouses typically diverge. Just as a spouse entering marriage with a cer-
tain earning capacity must generally share only income earned during mar-
riage, a spouse entering marriage with separate property should have to 
share only part of that property, a part that corresponds to the freedom and 
risk which that money bestows during the marriage. 112 Classifying all pre-
existing and unearned property as marital would be as nonsensical as classi-
fying all spouses' pre- and post-divorce earnings as marital. With few 
exceptions, postdivorce earnings belong to ex-spouses individually. The 
traditional partnership-theory rationale for this rule is that they were not a 
product of labor expended during the marriage. A more sensible rationale 
is that postdivorce earnings are not a part of the couple's collective financial 
capability during the marriage. 113 By the same token, property currently 
classified as separate should be allocated at divorce between two catego-
ries-one attributable to the marriage and the other attributable to the owner 
spouse's postdivorce life. In other words, if we think of the freedom con-
tained in a given asset as something that can be spread over the owner's ex-
pected lifespan, the part spread over the years of the marriage-and only 
that part-should be classified as marital property divisible at divorce. 
2. The Risk and Reward Allocation Formula.-What would this con-
cept translate into in practice? The risk and reward formula attributes prop-
erty acquired before marriage-preexisting property-to the marriage in the 
same proportion as the duration of the marriage bears to the length of time 
the property would have been expected to last-the owner's life expectancy 
as of the start of the marriage. In other words, marital property includes: 
Value of preexisting 
property 
X 
110 Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 113. 
Length of the marriage 
Owner spouse's life expectancy 
111 As Frantz and Dagan put it, "spouses should be expected to share the benefits and burdens of 
their life together, not those of their lives before (or after) the existence of the marital community." /d. 
112 Unlike income, which is reasonably expected to continue with some regularity after the marriage 
ends, preexisting property and one-time gratuitous receipts frequently will not. On the contrary, they are 
expected to last over time, for a period extending much beyond the year in which they were received. 
113 But see Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 363--64 (arguing that marital roles influence postdivorce 
earning power). 
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Property received during marriage-gifted or inherited property-
should be attributed to the marriage in the same proportion as the property's 
holding period (the length of time from receipt until the commencement of 
divorce proceedings) bears to the owner's life expectancy as of receipt. 
Thus, marital property also includes: 




Owner spouse's life expectancy 
For example, assume Husband and Wife are both thirty years old when 
they marry. They are both expected to live until eighty .114 Husband enters 
the marriage with $1 million. Wife has no preexisting property. 
Husband's Age: 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Life Expectancy 
Ten years later, when the spouses are forty, they divorce. At that time 
the husband's entire $1 million in preexisting holdings are intact. In order 
to figure out how much of the husband's property will be attributed to the 
marriage, we will need to spread the $1 million evenly over his life expec-
tancy. 
Preexisting Assets Spread Over Life Expectancy: 
$1,000,000 




114 For simplicity, this example and the following use eighty as the average life expectancy for all 
individuals. In fact, life expectancy rises with age and is generally higher for women than for men. For 
a succinct table correlating age, gender, and life expectancy, see Social Security Online, Actuarial Publi-
cations, Period Life Table, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). 
1653 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
The portion allocable to the marriage will bear the same proportion to 
the total property as the length of the marriage bears to his life expec-
tancy-in other words, one-fifth (ten years of marriage divided by his fifty-
year life expectancy). Thus $200,000 will be classified as marital property 
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If Husband and Wife are twenty when they marry and thirty when they 
divorce, the applicable ratio would be one-sixth (ten years of marriage di-
vided by Husband's sixty-year life expectancy) and only $166,667 of the $1 
million would be marital, leaving the husband with $833,333 for his longer 
postdivorce life. 
Suppose again the spouses are thirty years old when they marry, but in-
stead of entering the marriage with his $1 million, the husband inherits it 
eight years into the marriage when he is thirty-eight years old. In that case 
the inheritance will be classified using the second equation. It will be at-
tributed to the marriage based on the length of time from receipt to divorce 
and on his life expectancy as of the date of receipt. Thus, dividing the hold-
ing period, two years, by life expectancy as of receipt, forty-two years, 
gives 1/21. Thus, 1121 ofthe inheritance, or $47,619, will be classified as 
marital. 
By integrating the age of the owner spouse as well as the length of the 
marriage or holding period, the formula arrives at a recharacterization per-
centage that is both principled and fair. It requires both spouses to contrib-
ute comparably out of the resources available to them during the 
marriage-whether acquired before or during marriage, through labor or 
luck-thus joining their efforts as well as their allocable-to-the-marriage 
fortunes. The life expectancy component of the formula translates each 
spouse's wealth into a figure that represents what that wealth means to them 
during the marriage. The result ensures that similar levels of financial risk 
and security are attributed to both parties even where the spouses enter mar-
riage with disproportionate external resources. At the same time, it protects 
affluent spouses by limiting the amount by which a failed marriage may de-
plete their estate to one-half of the recharacterization percentage-in short-
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term marriages this amount will be relatively small. The parties' life expec-
tancy would be based on an objective standard, such as the actuarial tables 
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service. 115 
The system would treat all income from separate property as marital 
regardless of whether it represents the fruits of either spouse's labor. 
Again, income would belong to the marriage only for its duration; thus, a 
propertied spouse would only be contributing for the fraction of her lifetime 
during which she is married. Like earnings, income from separate property 
represents a slice of ongoing financial capability, which, if kept separate, 
would put spouses in fundamentally different positions. The same is true of 
distributions from trusts. Like income, they would be classified as marital 
property. 
A portion of debts incurred prior to marriage would be characterized as 
marital according to the same formula applicable to premarital property. 
Thus if the wife marries at thirty with $10,000 in debt from medical treat-
ments and the marriage lasts ten years, one-fifth (ten years of marriage di-
vided by fifty years in life expectancy) of that debt, or $2000, will be 
marital. Debts incurred during marriage would be marital unless they were 
incurred to maintain separate property, in which case they would be attrib-
uted to the marriage in the same proportion as the underlying property. 
115 The U.S. Department of Treasury publishes these tables for purposes of valuing annuities, inter-
ests for life or terms of years, and remainder or reversionary interests. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL'N NO. 1457, ACTUARIAL VALUES BOOK ALEPH (2007). 
Some jurisdictions already consider spouses' ages in divorce proceedings. However, age is generally 
related to the spouses' postdivorce needs rather than the backward-looking entitlement accrued in the 
course of marriage. Under my proposal, by contrast, age functions as an aid in determining the subjec-
tive financial capability of each spouse for the duration of marriage. See, e.g., Maynard v. King, 906 
A.2d 849, 852 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2006) (holding that a sixty-forty division of property in favor of the hus-
band was appropriate, in part, because "[h ]us band is clearly in worse health than wife, and also has the 
disadvantage of having less opportunity for future advancement and increases in salary because of his 
age"); Heinz v. Heinz, 632 N.W.2d 443, 449 (N.D. 2001) (affirming the trial court's award of spousal 
support in part because the likelihood of the wife to "substantially increas[ e] her earnings by obtaining a 
bachelor's degree is lessened by the difficulty she may have entering the job market at an advanced 
age"); see also Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 236, C236B:25 
(McKinney 1999) ("The age and health of the parties are ... relevant to consideration of the future fi-
nancial conditions of the parties. Advanced age or ill health may preclude a spouse from the pursuit of a 
full-time career and may, thus, warrant receipt of a greater share of marital assets .... [R]elative youth 
may indicate that the spouse would be able to achieve relative financial security by his or her own ef-
forts."). When parties are of roughly equivalent age, health, and economic station, courts are reluctant 
to award one spouse a greater share of the marital estate or invade a spouse's separate property for the 
benefit of the other. See Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that 
an invasion of nonmarital property for the other spouse was unwarranted because both parties were eld-
erly, in poor health, and neither had any likelihood of obtaining employment or acquiring additional as-
sets, and thus, neither party could demonstrate that a hardship was created by a property distribution that 
did not include an award of either party's nonmarital property to the other); cf Edinger v. Edinger, 724 
N.W.2d 852, 856 (S.D. 2006) (holding that the trial court's award of the parties' entire net worth to the 
husband was inequitable "considering the parties' similar age, health, competence to earn a living, and 
contributions to the accumulation of property"). 
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Thus, if the wife incurs the medical debt in year five of the marriage, the 
entire amount would be marital. Suppose instead that the wife marries 
owning a $300,000 summer home and during the marriage borrows $30,000 
to maintain the property. If the marriage lasts ten years out of her fifty-year 
life expectancy, then at divorce one-fifth of the house, or $60,000, would be 
marital property, and one-fifth of the debt, or $6000, would also be consid-
ered incurred to maintain the marital property. The remaining debt of 
$24,000 would be separate. 116 Mirroring the treatment of interest earned in 
the course of marriage, interest payments made during marriage would be 
marital. 
As in the examples above, the recharacterization percentage would be 
based on the value of assets at the front end: premarital assets would be 
valued at the outset of marriage, and gifts and devises would be valued 
when received. Nonliquid assets would be valued a second time at the back 
end-i.e., at divorce-to determine their appreciation or depreciation, 
which would be attributed in full to the marriage. This rule ensures that ap-
. preciation of separate property is attributed to the marriage in the same 
fashion as income and that depreciation is attributed in the same fashion as 
debt. 
Thus, in the first example above, if our thirty-year-old husband enters 
the marriage with a house worth $1 million, and if ten years later the house 
is worth $1.6 million, in addition to one-fifth of the front-end value 
($200,000) being marital, the entire $600,000 in appreciation would be 
marital as well. As a result, the proposal removes the current uncertainty 
surrounding the treatment of income from and appreciation of separate 
property. In jurisdictions that treat separate property-generated income as 
marital and appreciation as separate, the proposal would eliminate the arti-
ficial incentive to invest separate property in non-income-producing assets. 
If the value of the husband's house fell, say to $900,000, then one-fifth of 
the initial $1 million, or $200,000, would be marital, but also the entire 
$100,000 loss would be marital. Thus the final accounting for the house 
would produce $100,000 for the marital pot. 
Separate property spent during marriage would be presumptively mari-
tal. Thus, in the first example where the husband brought $1 million into 
the marriage, if more than $200,000 of this amount were spent in the course 
of the ten-year marriage, there would be no credit to his separate account at 
divorce. Whatever was left would simply be separate. If less than the 
$200,000 allocable to the marriage were spent, say $50,000,_ then $150,000 
116 For current treatment of debts, see Brett R. Turner, Division of Debts upon Divorce, EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION J., June 2003, at 61 (evaluating the process for division of debts, such as ascertaining 
whether a legal obligation exists, determining whether the debt is marital or personal (like a gambling 
debt), deciding whether the debt is a result of dissipation, and considering methods of apportioning or 
allocating the debt). 
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of the remaining funds would be designated marital at divorce, and the 
same $800,000 as before would remain separate. 
The system would replace transmutation by use, which, in the states 
that apply it, essentially punishes separate property holders for sharing their 
property during marriage. m The proposed formula would eliminate this 
perverse result and the harmful incentive structure it sets up. Similarly, 
commingled property would not necessarily be deemed marital. Untangling 
separate and marital property commingled in the course of marriage would 
require a tracing process similar to that currently employed in many divorce 
cases. This process can be especially complex when withdrawals are made 
from an account containing both types of property, and authorities are split 
as to the correct treatment of such withdrawals. 118 The proposed system 
would present similar tracing challenges; though complex, they would not 
be more onerous than the challenges under the current system and would be 
solvable using the same range of methods currently available. Other valua-
tion issues-for example, the valuation of trusts and family businesses-
would also pose difficulties no more complex than those that already riddle 
valuation of property at divorce. 119 The risk and reward approach would 
also incorporate existing doctrines dealing with waste or dissipation of 
marital assets. 120 
Spouses would be permitted to contract out of the system-whether 
prior to or during marriage. Such opt-out would only be possible by mutual 
agreement. By contrast, the ALI's and Frantz and Dagan's more liberal 
opt-out approaches permit one party to unilaterally change the rules of the 
marriage midstream. However, if there is no premarital agreement, a 
spouse who wishes to keep separate a gift or inheritance received during 
marriage, and is unable to obtain the other party's consent, may disclaim 
the gift. Disclaiming would not override the proposed allocation rule; it 
would simply revert the property to the donor in the case of a gift or cause it 
to pass to the next beneficiary under the will. This result would be prefer-
117 See Oldham, supra note I, at 246 ("[Transmutation by use] punishes generous spouses for al-
lowing the other spouse to use separate property. Spouses who hoard are rewarded."). 
118 For a discussion of the various methods currently used in dealing with withdrawals from com-
mingled accounts, see OLDHAM, supra note 15, § 11.03( 1]-(2]. 
119 See Brett R. Turner, Interests in Trnsts as Marital Property, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J., Sept. 
2004, at 97 (describing the different property treatments of revocable trusts, irrevocable trusts, income 
interests, and remainder interests). 
120 Waste or dissipation of marital assets is a relevant factor in property settlements. See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1)(i) (West 2007); IND. CODE § 31-15-7-4 (2007); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 236B(l)(d)(ll) (McKinney 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-5-16.1 (2007); see also OLDHAM, supra note 
15, § 13.02[l][d]. If a spouse is guilty of dissipating the marital estate, those assets are charged against 
the spouse in an equitable distribution. Stated alternatively, the dissipating spouse will receive a smaller 
portion of the marital estate to compensate for his or her wasteful activities. See, e.g., Schneider v. 
Schneider, 864 So. 2d 1193, 1196--97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Jonsson v. Jonsson, 715 So. 2d 1064, 
1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Newby v. Newby, 734 N.E.2d 663,667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Reaney v. 
Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). 
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able to a rigid application of the proposal where the rectptent of a gift 
wishes to use the funds to take care of other family members such as a dis-
abled parent or sibling. In such a case, a rule requiring that the gift be 
shared with the recipient's spouse would be inappropriate. 
Donor intent, on the other hand, should not override the proposed re-
characterization rule. The rule is geared toward making property settle-
ments and divorce fairer, and marriages more harmonious. Donors who 
condition their gifts by prohibiting recipient spouses from sharing jeopard-
ize these values. Thus, just as current caselaw disregards conditions en-
couraging divorce as contrary to public policy,121 conditions limiting 
spousal sharing of gifts should also be disregarded. 122 
Where divorce proceedings are already underway, none of the gifts or 
inheritances received would be subject to the proposed rule. The length-of-
marriage and holding-period "clocks" would also cease to toll for purposes 
of calculating the recharacterization percentage on previously acquired 
property. The precise moment of dissolution would be determined accord-
ing to the same methods currently in use. 123 
Once the classification stage is complete, marital property would be 
divided with a presumption in favor of equal division because the central 
premise of the system is attributing equal freedom and risk to both parties 
during marriage. Spouses owning assets carrying a sentimental value 
would have a right of first purchase. Where the value of these assets ex-
ceeds fifty percent of the marital pot, an equitable distribution would be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis. 124 
B. Added Benefits 
Like the partnership theory, the proposed paradigm ensures that 
homemakers are compensated for their labor. But unlike the partnership 
theory, this approach does not impose an artificial fiction. Rather than pre-
tending that monetary and nonmonetary contributions have the same value, 
121 See In re Estate of Newalla, 837 P.2d 1373, 1379 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Graves v. First Nat'! 
Bank in Grand Forks, 138 N.W.2d 584,588-89 (N.D. 1965); Fineman v. Cent. Nat'! Bank of Cleveland, 
175 N.E.2d 837,842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961). 
122 See Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 117 ("To be separate, the donor must intend the property 
for only one of the spouses-gifts and inheritances to both spouses are marital property as a matter of 
course. While donor intent currently determines the designation of such assets as marital or separate 
property, it should not be dispositive. After all, most employers intend to pay wages to only one spouse, 
but this is irrelevant to the classification of wages earned during marriage as marital property."). 
123 SeeOLDHAM,supranote 15. 
124 Frantz and Dagan believe that in such cases the entire property should be assigned to the original 
owner. See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 118. In addition to producing unfair results--e.g., where 
earnings accumulated by the other spouse were used to maintain the property during marriage-this rule 
creates an incentive on the part of propertied families to give married beneficiaries only or primarily 
nonliquid property so as to avoid the application of the sharing rule. As already indicated, postdivorce 
support payments-alimony-and the relevance of fault in the distribution of marital property are out-
side the scope of this Article. 
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the proposal matches most people's intuition that husbands' and wives' 
various contributions to marriage cannot and need not be compared. It also 
recognizes that spouses often contribute unequally at different points in 
their relationship as employment and health circumstances change. Indeed, 
in terms of labor contributed, some marriages are unequal from start to fin-
ish. The proposal embodies the notion that matrimony fuses spouses' risks 
and rewards regardless of their relative contributions of labor. 
If adopted, the proposed marital property regime would likely impact 
attitudes toward separate property during marriage. 125 It would also likely 
recast the sharing that already occurs within healthy marriages. Many 
propertied spouses share at least some of their separate wealth with their 
partner, often more than would be required under the proposed system. 126 
But while working spouses share because they are obliged to, beneficiaries 
of gifted or inherited wealth share as a favor--out of "generosity." This 
imbalance breeds tension and resentment. By devising an objective formula 
for how much sharing is fair and logical, the proposal serves an expressive 
function, relabeling sharing that already occurs as a basic marital duty. 
Likewise, the proposal would ensure that spouses' employment deci-
sions are informed by a comparable sense of freedom and risk. Under the 
current paradigm, the fact that spouses' separate property remains sheltered 
from the marriage means that spouses with significant differences in pre-
marital and unearned property are likely to have widely divergent exposure 
to risk and therefore fundamentally different attitudes about work. The 
proposal turns spouses with disproportionate outside safety nets into mem-
bers of a team for the duration of the marriage. 
Though couples would be permitted to override the proposed formula 
by private contract, some propertied brides and grooms may find that the 
new paradigm obviates the need for a "prenup." The reasonable limitations 
that the proposal places on the amount of separate property subject to divi-
125 On the potential effects of divorce law on ongoing marriages, see ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, 
§ 4.12 cmt. a, at 772; Frantz & Dagan, supra note I 0, at 97-98 ("[T]o the extent that law can ever affect 
social understandings, marital law is at the center of public awareness and debate ... [and] many parties 
to ongoing marriages have themselves been divorced, or are at least intimately familiar with the divorce 
of a close friend or relative. While most spouses may not know all of the legal details, they may be af-
fected by their accumulated impact: the experiences, practices, and social expectations generated by the 
principles underlying the legal dogma."); Williams, Do Wives Own Half!, supra note 12, at 269. 
126 See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 4.12 reporter's notes cmt. a. Financial advisor Bedda 
D'Angelo also reports that: 
In 3 7 years ... I have never met anyone who did not expect to share I 00% of everything they 
owned before marriage with their spouse. . . . Couples that have been married only once for a 
number of years do not even remember they once owned assets separately and when one of them 
inherits, they almost immediately re-title assets so that they are jointly owned. Likewise with 
spousal pension benefits. It is a whole different ball game if even one spouse has been married be-
fore. Divorced or widowed, I have never met anyone who did not expect to retain the assets they 
brought into the marriage in their own name. 
E-mail from Bedda D'Angelo, President, Fiduciary Solutions, to author (Aug. I I, 2007, 3:20 EST) (on 
file with author). 
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sion at divorce is likely to alleviate some wealthy fiances' concerns, sparing 
them and their future spouses the anguish that often surrounds premarital 
agreement negotiations. For spouses who do wish to write their own con-
tract and for life partners who seek to formalize a commitment other than 
through civil marriage, the proposed allocation system provides an objec-
tive, anxiety-reducing starting point for a sharing plan that is both safe and 
just. Finally, at the divorce stage, even if legislatures or courts do not adopt 
the view of marriage as merger of risk and reward, for couples engaged in 
collaborative negotiations it offers a yardstick that is fairer and clearer than 
many of the doctrines currently in use. 127 
C. Potential Objections 
The proposal raises a number of potential objections. First, the system 
effectively spreads wealth equally over an owner's life, whereas in fact 
many people spend different amounts at different stages in life. Some own-
ers view their capital as something they will use only at retirement or in 
case of an emergency. Others expect to leave most of it to individual bene-
ficiaries or to charity. At the opposite pole, some people's spending pat-
terns would imply that their capital should be frontloaded. A wife who uses 
most of her premarital assets to purchase a home on day one of the marriage 
has fundamentally affected the couple's life at the front end. 
This objection, however, misconstrues the conceptual framework of 
shared risk and reward. The idea behind the proposed system is not that 
property owners are likely to spend the full amount attributed to any given 
year. Rather, allocating the property annually reflects the power to spend, 
save, or give for that slice of time and ensures that the emotional repercus-
sions of this power are shared during the marriage. A husband who re-
serves every penny of his inheritance for old age still enjoys this money 
long before he retires. The formula turns a yearly slice of this security into 
something shared. A wife who uses her inheritance to purchase a home 
may have spent her capital upfront, but the house she purchased is expected 
to last over time. The formula turns this large front-end contribution into 
something the husband will share in more and more over time. If the mar-
riage dissolves three years later, the husband will not be entitled to half of 
the house. Naturally, even the emotional repercussions of the power to 
spend, save, or gift will vary from year to year. A big career break may di-
minish one's emotional reliance on a financial safety net. A professional 
setback or a serious illness may increase this reliance. Allocating risk and 
reward over life expectancy provides a simple and objective conceptual ru-
bric that will, on average, balance power in marriage more effectively than 
the current paradigm. 
127 On the influence of divorce default rules on negotiated settlements, see Singer, supra note 12, at 
1120. 
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Second, a parallel objection applies to the inclusion of all marital earn-
ings in the joint marital pot. Especially in professions that generate widely 
fluctuating income streams, the earnings rule may attribute to marriage in-
come that in terms of a spouse's long-term economic realities should be at-
tributed to the spouse over many years. For example, shortly after her 
wedding a writer sells for a lump sum a manuscript she had been working 
on for many years. Should the marriage dissolve shortly thereafter, attribut-
ing the entire spike in her income to the marriage seems unfair. This prob-
lem is the sort of inevitable side effect that any bright-line rule produces. In 
practice it could be dealt with through an exception to the formula which 
would be triggered when a substantial spike in income is apparent. 128 
Third, one might object that because the owner spouse's life expec-
tancy is in the denominator of the formula, a greater proportion of late-to-
marry spouses' separate property will be recharacterized at divorce. The 
logic, again, is that because they have less time to live, the same amount 
will take them further than it would have in their youth, and this sense of 
freedom and security should be shared in marriage. Elderly brides and 
grooms who expect to leave significant amounts in their will would thus be 
jeopardized by the rule as a larger proportion of their assets would be 
deemed marital, just as they and their beneficiaries are jeopardized by cur-
rent elective share statutes. Elective share statutes generally allow the dis-
inherited spouse to claim a significant portion of the testator's estate, 129 and 
sometimes this estate includes all property titled in the testator's name, in-
cluding assets that would be deemed separate had the marriage ended in di-
vorce. 130 Seniors who do not expect to spend most of their estate during 
their own lifetime and who would like to control its passage after death are 
free to either gift their property before they marry or draft a premarital 
agreement opting out of the default divorce and elective share rules. 
Marriage should have real consequences. It should not be the loose, 
economically insignificant symbolic marker that the labor-centered rule 
makes it for couples who meet after their significant income-generating 
years. Marriage is different from an intimate relationship where the merg-
ing of fates is not an essential element. Some couples--old and young-
keep all finances separate, some share only household expenses, and others 
pool assets on an ad hoc basis. The disappearance of the taboo against co-
habitation means that unmarried couples can now choose from a range of 
128 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of income averaging in tax policy litera-
ture, see Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
395 (2003); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1151 (2006); Lee 
Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REv. I (2005); Richard Schmalbeck, In-
come Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509. 
129 OOBRIS ET AL., supra note 60, at 147. 
130 See Rosenbury, supra note I, at 1245-46. 
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private contracting options to formalize their arrangement. 131 The growing 
acceptance of premarital agreements today means that married couples can 
also pick and choose among a range of alternatives, creating their own rules 
for how much, if any, property is shared during marriage and upon dissolu-
tion. 
In light of this range of choices, if the law continues to use marriage as 
an eligibility criterion for special treatment, marriage should carry real eco-
nomic significance. Indeed, income, gift, and estate tax benefits as well as 
bankruptcy advantages available only to spouses are premised on an as-
sumption that husband and wife form one economic unit. Economically 
united spouses can be seen as earning the government benefits they receive; 
their promise to take care of each other in sickness and in health, for richer 
or for poorer, reduces the likelihood taxpayers will have to pay for one of 
them falling through the cracks. Thus, the exchange-benefits for com-
mitment-is rational on both ends. Elsewhere I have argued that tax and 
other benefits should be limited to couples who are in fact legally obligated 
to share their resources, regardless of their marital status. 132 But seeing that 
marriage-based eligibility criteria for public benefits are unlikely to change 
soon, there are compelling arguments to prohibit premarital agreements that 
erode economic unity in marriage. 133 This is also unlikely, as the trend has 
been towards broader acceptance of private ordering in marriage. But at the 
very least, the default rules of marriage should reflect the economic unity 
with which the institution is presumed to be synonymous. Placing the bur-
den on couples who do not wish to merge risk and reward is correct because 
marriage matters. It matters enough to warrant benefits; these benefits 
should be linked to real spousal obligations. 
131 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2007); D.C. CODE § 32-702 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§§ 572C-I to -7 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 26:8A-1 to -4 (West 2008); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 
(Cal. 1976); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 6; Cynthia 
Grant Bowman, Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in the United States, 26 LAW & POL'Y 119 (2004); 
William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 
2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (surveying domestic partnership laws in the United States); Ann Laquer Estin, 
Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage 
Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 353; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage and 
Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435 (2001). 
132 Motro, supra note 8; Shari Motro & Peter Smallwood, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2007, §A, at 12; Shari Motro, Op-Ed., The I.R.S.'s Shotgun Marriage, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 14, 2006, §A, 
at 21. 
133 See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 
53 CLEV. Sr. L. REv. 359, 397-98 (2005-06) ("Prenuptial agreements should be held per se unenforce-
able to the extent they purport to limit a spouse's entitlements to alimony or equitable distribution of 
property in the event of divorce. To allow married persons to cherry-pick the concomitants of their mar-
riage-to avail themselves of the advantages the law confers upon them while evading, by governing 
instrument, the burdens the law would impose upon them-is inequitable. If they want the perks, they 
must take the works. If a marriage-bent couple wishes to preserve the low exit costs associated with 
domestic partnership, then the couple must settle for domestic partnership in its entirety."). 
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Fourth, using objective actuarial standards to determine the parties' life 
expectancies could cause distortions where parties are likely to die before or 
outlive their projected mortality dates. The terminally ill propertied spouse 
would thus benefit from an overly optimistic life expectancy, which would 
spread assets more thinly over the years of a failed marriage. The unusually 
healthy spouse would be harmed because the formula would divide the 
length of the marriage by a denominator that is smaller than is appropriate. 
The distortion in favor of the terminally ill would strike most people as tol-
erable. At the opposite extreme, the unusually healthy who outlive their life 
expectancy would admittedly suffer under the proposal. But keep in mind 
that even where the divorce occurs after the expected mortality date of the 
property owning spouse, no more than fifty percent of marital property 
would go to the nonpropertied spouse. If the propertied spouse managed to 
outlive his or her projected life expectancy as of the date of marriage, the 
marriage is likely to have lasted long enough so that some of these separate 
assets were shared. Thus, the result under the proposed formula would be 
no more onerous than current transmutation doctrines. 
Fifth, some might argue that by linking recharacterization to length of 
marriage, the formula encourages divorce. A propertied spouse in a rocky 
marriage pays a price for every additional year spent trying to make the 
marriage work. But this is equally true under the current rule when instead 
of separate property, one spouse earns significantly more than the other. 
Every additional year of marriage translates into an additional year of earn-
ings being deemed marital. Ultimately, spouses teetering on the edge of di-
vorce often engage in mercenary calculations surrounding spending and 
accumulating assets so as to maximize their postdivorce positions, and the 
proposed system would neither curb nor exacerbate these behaviors. 
Finally, the implications of the proposal for a non-wage-earning spouse 
who owns separate property and who performs the brunt of the couple's 
housework and childcare may initially seem unfair. Such a spouse would 
be forced to contribute to the marriage "twice"-with labor as well as with 
property. But this objection is rooted in a contribution-of-labor view of 
marital equity. In terms of risks and rewards, a stay-at-home spouse whose 
unearned or premarital wealth remains intact is effectively allowed to hedge 
her bets. By turning a portion of this outside safety net into a part of the 
couple's joint decisionmaking calculus, the proposal forces nonearning 
spouses-often women-to contribute to the marriage comparably in terms 
of risk. For wives who now leave the workforce relying on separate wealth 
should their marriage fail, the rule would create an incentive to stay put. In 
the long-term, it may curb the exodus of elite-educated women from the 
workforce-the so-called "opt-out revolution."134 Again, where the non-
134 The opt-out revolution refers to the perceived trend of highly educated, professional women who 
leave the workforce to become stay-at-horne mothers. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK (2006); 
Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. nMEs, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42; Linda R. 
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wage earner has no premarital assets and receives no gifts or inheritances 
during the marriage, the formula would have no effect. 
The system also protects non- or low-wage earners who rely on their 
spouse's premarital or unearned resources. Thus, for example, a full-time 
mother married to a man who spends most of his time managing the chari-
table foundation he founded with inherited wealth will be entitled to a por-
tion of the money that informed both spouses' decisions during marriage-
the wife's decision to care for the couple's children and the husband's deci-
sion to forgo gainful employment. Where the primary earner also has sub-
stantial separate property, the proposal ensures that both spouses face 
similar risks, reducing the vulnerability of the nonpropertied spouse who 
earns little or nothing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
An extreme example of the poisonous effects of imbalances in hus-
bands' and wives' financial security can be seen in the film Fargo. The 
film is based on the true story of an unsuccessful car salesman who attempts 
to have his wife kidnapped in order to share in the ransom proceeds that her 
father-a successful businessman-would pay over. Early in the story we 
learn that the spouses do not share in life's risks and rewards, a fact that be-
comes apparent when the husband appeals to his father-in-law to help him 
invest in a real estate project. If the venture is successful, he explains, it 
could work out very well for him, his wife Jean, and their son Scotty. The 
father-in-law dismisses him without so much as glancing in his direction. 
"Jean and Scotty," he says, "will never have to worry [about money]." The 
husband then finalizes the kidnapping plot, with tragic results. 135 
Frantz and Dagan were right: "[L]abor should not be the standard for 
inclusion in the marital estate--even the fruits of good luck ... ought to be 
marital property."136 This Article takes their observation to its logical con-
clusion. If marriage turns independent economic beings into a risk-sharing 
team, the blanket exclusion of unearned and preexisting assets from marital 
property is indefensible. 
Property subject to division at divorce should reflect both spouses' 
economic identity during marriage-including labor- and luck-generated 
Hirshman, Homeward Bound, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2005, at 20; Claudia Wallis, The Case for Staying 
Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 51; Martha Lagace, Getting Back on Course, HARV. Bus. SCH. 
WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Sept. 4, 2001, http:/lhbswk.hbs.edu!iteml2457.html ("Data collected from 
women in the [HBS] reunion classes of 1981, 1986, and 1991 indicates that only 38 percent of the re-
spondents from the three classes are currently working full time."); Posting of Richard Posner to The 
Becker-Posner B log, http://www. becker-posner -blog.comlarchives/200 5/09/e1 ite _ universit.html (Sept. 
25, 2005, 21:17 CST) ("[Recent newspaper articles] confirm[}--what everyone associated with such 
[elite] institutions has long known-that a vastly higher percentage of female than male students will 
drop out of the work force to take care of their children."). 
135 FARGO (MGM 1996). 
136 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 117. 
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property-regardless of source. This proposal spreads separate property 
over the life of the owner spouse and allocates to the marriage a portion of 
this property corresponding to the spouse's financial capability during the 
union. The result yields a fairer and more predictable system than the cur-
rent partnership-based divorce model. It removes inequities in the treat-
ment of workers and owners, eliminates sharing disincentives, protects 
propertied spouses from losing significant portions of their estates follow-
ing short-lived marriages, bolsters the security of dependent spouses, and 
offers an objective standard for sharing between spouses with disparate re-
sources. Marriage should not mean one thing for workers and another for 
those who acquire property in other ways. Rather, it should place both 
spouses in the same boat. The proposal applies a comparable standard to 
both earners and owners, tying together labor, luck, and love, for the benefit 
of all. 
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